The euro: how the socio-occupational groups view it. The euro in the spotlight by unknown
en 
uJ 
0 
Economic and Social Committee 
The euro: 
how the socio-occupational 
•  •  groups v1ew 1t ·; 'I tj z  I  33  tj  t.; 2  I  3  I  3 3 2- ~ ;/  3 3 2 J  Co 
Economic and Social Committee 
The euro: 
how the socio-occupational 
•  •  groups v1ew 1t This booklet is published in: 
Spanish, Danish, German, Greek, English, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, 
Finnish and Swedish. 
Reproduction is authorized, except for commercial purposes, provided that the 
source is acknowledged. 
Flyleaf by IEED asbl CONTENTS 
Forewords by: 
•  Tom jenkins, President of the Economic and Social Committee  ............ 4 
•  Goke Frerichs, President of the Section for Economic, 
Financial and Monetary Questions  ........................................................ 6 
•  jorge Stecher Navarra, President of the Permanent Study Group 
on the Introduction of the Single Currency  ........................................... 8 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
Market Implications of  the legislation and regulations required 
for the transition to the single currency  ................................................................. 9 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
Impact of  Economic and Monetary Union: economic and social aspects 
of  convergence and measures to  increase awareness of  the single currency  .............. 21 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
Communication from the Commission on the impact of  the introduction 
of  the euro on capital markets  ............................................................................ 53 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
Communication from the Commission on the practical aspects 
of  the introduction of  the euro  ............................................................................ 61 
PRO. MEM.: Gist of the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements for the Introduction 
of  the Single Currency ........................................................................................ 67 
Using the euro- no more difficult than child's play!  ........................................ 70 4 
Foreword by the president of the Economic and Social Committee, 
Tom Jenkins 
On 1 January 1999 Europe will 
begin the third and final stage of 
economic and monetary union; the 
exchange rates of the participating 
states' currencies will be irrevocably 
fixed, and, three years later, the 
countries of Europe will introduce a 
single currency. The very effort to 
meet the criteria for participating in 
EMU has changed the European 
economic and financial landscape. 
The EU Member States have 
achieved a remarkable degree of sta-
bility which seemed scarcely possible 
just a few years ago. 
Europe's nation states have decided 
to adopt a currency which they are 
no longer able to create themselves. 
The introduction of a single curren-
cy in Europe thus goes far beyond 
the realm of economics. It will make 
the process of European unification 
irreversible, forging closer ties 
Tom jenkins 
between the societies of the various 
Member States. European monetary 
union will have implications for a 
great many areas of politics, the 
economy and everyday life.  It will 
place new demands not just on 
politicians, economists and business, 
but on every single one of us. 
The representatives of Europe's 
socio-economic groupings who 
make up the Economic and Social 
Committee have already been con-
fronting this challenge for a number 
of years. They welcome monetary 
union as  providing the strategic 
answer to the global challenges 
which Europe is  now facing. 
The permanent study group on the 
single currency, set up by the ESC 
as early as  1994, was responsible for 
preparing the ground for a series of 
Committee opinions on matters 
relating to the implementation of monetary union, including the 
practical aspects of the introduction 
of a single currency, the machinery, 
the legal framework and the eco-
nomic and social implications. 
These opinions are primarily 
addressed to the institutions and 
organizations involved in the 
implementation of EMU, but they 
are also intended to provide a basis 
for discussion for all the socio-eco-
nomic groupings in the Member 
States. There is still a great general 
need for information. For this rea-
son, and in order to stimulate pub-
lic debate on the introduction of 
the euro and to reduce uncertainty, 
the ESC is publishing this brochure 
setting out many of the opinions 
which it has issued. 
Europe is  increasingly having to 
compete with other regions which 
have made considerable progress in 
bringing their economies up to 
strength and becoming competitive. 
In this international climate of 
competition, Europe will only be 
able to sustain its position if it is 
willing to speak with one voice in 
the field of economic policy. We 
will no longer be able to afford to 
take economic policy decisions 
independently from one another. 
Monetary union promises to bring 
great economic and political oppor-
tunities with relatively little risk.  It 
will safeguard and boost growth 
and employment in the European 
internal market. The establishment 
of monetary union will also provide 
the impetus for a truly European 
economic and employment policy, 
thereby helping to preserve and 
build on the prosperity already 
achieved. This economic impetus 
will be of benefit to all  Europeans 
in the long term. 
*  *  * 
As part of the PRINCE programme 
the Economic and Social Commit-
tee has organized conferences on 
the introduction of the euro, in col-
laboration with the EC Commis-
sion and the European Parliament. 
In Portugal and Spain consumer 
associations participated in the 
organization of the conferences, 
whilst in Italy and the UK trade 
unions acted as  partners. 
This process will, of course, contin-
ue in other Member States from 
now until when EMU becomes 
permanent. 
5 6 
Foreword by the president of the Section for Economic, 
Financial and Monetary Questions, Goke Frerichs 
Europe needs Monetary Union. The 
euro will herald the completion of 
the Internal Market and Europe will 
become a stable, uniform economic 
area. The increasing globalization of 
international markets exacerbates 
the risk that monetary fragmenta-
tion could create undesirable disrup-
tion calculated to hamper growth, 
employment and prosperity in 
Europe. On the international eco-
nomic and financial markets, a sta-
ble euro will have much greater 
clout than national European cur-
rencies have today. It will be capable 
of ironing out or cushioning the 
adverse repercussions of massive 
capital inflows or outflows on the 
economy, on inflation and interest 
Coke Frerichs 
rate trends, and on employment. 
The advantages of  monetary union 
therefore outweigh the risks for 
businesses, workers and consumers. 
Every citizen, i.e. every worker, busi-
nessman, self employed person, con-
sumer, tourist or investor can direct-
ly reap the benefits. 
The abolition of exchange rate fluc-
tuations will remove a significant 
obstacle to trade and investment in 
the European economic area. For 
small and medium sized businesses 
in particular, which in recent years 
have been more successful in job 
creation than large undertakings, 
irritating, expensive currency risk 
guarantee costs will disappear, mak-ing more funds available for invest-
ment. Planning for investment and 
intra European trade will also be 
safer.  Monetary union and the single 
market will combine to improve the 
distribution of  labour and to boost 
productivity in Europe; this in turn 
will create additional potential for 
growth and employment. The single 
currency will make it easier to com-
pare prices throughout the Union 
and to create an area with total price 
transparency. 
Close economic policy coordination 
is a prerequisite for solving employ-
ment problems in Europe. All previ-
ous attempts on the basis of purely 
national fiscal policy have failed. 
Monetary union will compel Europe 
to coordinate its economic policy 
closely and will be an important cat-
alyst for a genuine European eco-
nomic and employment policy. The 
level of  economic convergence 
which EU Member States have 
achieved in the run up to monetary 
union is extremely encouraging, 
especially since only a few years ago, 
many experts were sceptical about 
the feasibility of  achieving conver-
gence on such a scale. 
The EMU area will become the 
world's largest economic force in 
terms of G D P and external trade. 
Monetary union will give Europe an 
economic boost whose impact will 
be felt far beyond the boundaries of 
our continent. 8 
Foreword by the president of the Permanent Study Group 
on the Introduction of the Single Currency, Jorge Stecher Navarra 
The study group that I have been proud 
to chair for more than two years has 
been working intensively on preparing 
opinions in an effort to cooperate with 
the European Commission on the transi-
tion towards the single currency. Now 
we can say that as of 1 January 1999, the 
euro will be the sole legal tender in the 
European Union and that national notes 
and coins in circulation will be expressed 
as  rounded fractions of the new Euro-
pean currency. Legal provisions have also 
been drawn up to ensure that contracts 
established in national currencies will be 
valid in euros. To ensure continuity in 
the main financial markets, other non-
European countries have also accepted 
these provisions. All of this means that 
monetary union will not be a purely 
European phenomenon, but rather an 
historic development in the world mone-
tary system. 
Up to now, world currencies have 
offered no real alternative to the dollar. 
In future, and against the backdrop of 
the globalization of the capital markets, 
forge Stecher Navarra 
this will no longer be the case. The euro 
will replace the dollar as  the invoicing 
currency of many transactions in inter-
national trade, as  the reserve currency of 
central banks and as  the preferred cur-
rency of  world-wide investors. In the 
near future, it is not unlikely that there 
will be three spheres of influence made 
up of the dollar, the yen and the euro, as 
the euro will undoubtedly attract the 
countries of central and eastern Europe, 
the Middle East and North Mrica. All of 
this could mean greater stability for the 
global economy and financial markets, 
ensuring that the European Union is an 
equal player in the globalized world 
economy. 
The increasing competition between 
banks and financial systems in general 
will lead to more effective use of avail-
able resources and will boost investment. 
As a result, new jobs will be generated. 
Lastly, it must be said that the euro, sup-
ported by a European Union with 
healthy finances, low inflation, low 
interest rates and an independent central 
bank, will deserve the confidence of the 
markets and will be a stable and strong 
currency. Rapporteur: Umberto BURAN! (Italic- Employers) 
Opinion adopted on 31  October 1996 
Foreword 
1.1.  As  the dates laid down by the 
Treaty for the completion of EMU 
approach, preparatory work is  f~r~ing 
ahead in a number of areas reqmnng 
action by the European authorities. In 
accordance with the programme marked 
out by the Green Paper on the practical 
arrangements for the introdl!-c~ion o.f the 
single currenci, the Commtsston - m 
agreement with the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) - is preparing a draft 
Council Regulation establishing the 
legal infrastructure for the use of the 
Euro. The Commission's work should be 
completed by the end of 1  996. 
1.2.  The present Committee Opinion 
follows on from the Opinion adopted 
in October 1995 on the Green Paper 
on the practical arrangements for the 
introduction of the single currenci and 
the own-initiative Opinion adopted in 
September 1996 on the I~  pact of  Ec~­
nomic and Monetary Umon: economtc 
and social aspects of convergence and 
measures to increase awareness of the 
single currency' . Quite apart fr~m for-
mal considerations, the Economtc and 
Social Committee considers it to be its 
function and duty to collaborate with 
the drawing up of draft legislation 
which should not only meet the need 
to create a sound legal framework for 
the single currency, but is  also respon-
sive to market requirements. Above all, 
the transition must be kept as  straight-
forward as  possible, free of bureaucratic 
and procedural obstacles and, as  far as 
possible, compatible with the usages 
and customs of each market. 
1.3.  No official documents have yet 
been published by either the Commis-
sion or the EMI. The views expressed by 
the Committee therefore refer to the 
working and discussion papers which are 
progressively emerging in various quar-
COM(95) 333 of31 May 1995 
2  OJ No.  C  18 of22January 1996, p.  112 
3  CES  1089/96 of 26 September 1996 
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ters.  The latest Commission document 
on which these comments are based is 
dated 27 July; subsequent changes have 
been taken into consideration subject to 
the working time available and the con-
straints of  ESC procedure. 
2.  General comments 
2.1.  The legal basis of the Regula-
tion is  not yet clear.  It is  in the Com-
mittee's view important that the rules 
should come into force within the time 
limits set and should apply to all  the 
Member States, whether or not partici-
pating in EMU. 
2.2.  The Committee is pleased to 
note that many of the proposals made 
in its Opinion of October 1995 have 
been taken up in the Commission's 
preliminary work; it notes, on the 
other hand, that certain aspects of con-
siderable importance - which will be 
recalled in the present Opinion - do 
not appear to have been taken into 
consideration. 
2.3.  One of the aspects highlighted 
by the Committee concerned contracts 
drawn up between residents of  Single 
Currency countries and residents of 
derogation countries and between resi-
dents of Single Currency countries, 
and residents of derogation countries 
and between residents of  Single Cur-
rency countries and residents of third 
countries which are governed by the 
legislation of  derogation or third coun-
tries4.  Such contracts include issues of 
securities and rates of return on fixed-
interest securities, particularly when 
quoted on the stock exchanges of third 
countries. The Committee had asked 
the Commission and the IME "to 
establish official contacts in order to 
obtain assurances that in connection 
with observance of contractual rules 
the introduction of the Single Curren-
cy will not lead to any disturbances on 
European and third-country markets". 
2.4.  The Committee is  pleased to 
note that this suggestion has been 
accepted, at least as  far as  the securities 
and monetary markets are concerned. 
Commission contacts with the Interna-
tional Primary Market Association 
(IPMA) and the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) are 
preparing the ground for the forth-
coming decision to officially accept 
conversion from the ECU to the Euro 
at a one-for-one rate. Further steps, 
probably in relation to third country 
governments and/or the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), will also be nec-
essary to ensure continuity of  contracts 
concluded with residents of third 
countries. 
2.5.  Clearly, no national or Euro-
pean legislation can have extra-territo-
rial scope. It is  nevertheless essential 
for economic operators dealing with 
third countries to have the certainty 
that both the ready acceptance of the 
Euro and the validity and continuity 
of  contracts will be guaranteed. It 
should be noted in this respect that 
while international law recognizes the 
right of countries to change the value 
and denomination of their currency, 
the automatic recognition of the right 
- applicable erga omnes - to legislate 
on conversion rates between different 
currencies is less clear. 
4  Op.cit. (footnote 2), paragraphs 7.4., 7.5. and 
7.6. Contracts between residents of  Single Cur-
rency countries and derogation countries should 
not cause such problems, since the Council Reg-
ulation will clearly be valid for all  EU countries 
without distinction. 3.  Replacing the ECU and 
national currencies with the Euro 
3.1.  The Regulation will confirm the 
decisions already taken by the Council: 
with effect from 1 January 1999, the 
Euro will become the currency of the 
participating Member States, and the 
national currencies with their subdivi-
sions will become fractions of the single 
currency, at conversion rates to be 
determined. The Euro currency unit 
will be subdivided into hundredths. 
This arrangement permits automatic 
equivalence between the Euro and the 
participating currencies. Other provi-
sions, which have already been made 
known and require no particular com-
ment, concern: 
the choice of the Euro as  the unit of 
account of the European Central 
Bank (~CB) and of the participating 
currene1es; 
replacement of reference (explicit or 
implicit) to the ECU by reference to 
the Euro in all legal instruments
5
,  it 
remaining confirmed that the con-
version rate will be Euro 1 for 
ECU 1. 
3.2.  With respect to continuity of 
contracts, the Council Regulation 
endorses the principle that introducing 
the Euro cannot have the effect of  mod-
ifYing the terms of contracts, or of enti-
tling one of the parties to change them 
or to withdraw from the contract. 
4.  Provisions applicable during 
the transitional period 
4.1.  The Regulation introduces the 
concept of a "transitional period", cor-
responding to the Green Paper's "Phase 
B", or "the third stage" in the words of 
the Treacy'; this would in practice be 
the three year period between the date 
of effective commencement of EMU 
(1  January 1999) until the day before 
the date of the final switch to the single 
currency (31  December 2001). 
4.2.  Under one approach which had 
begun to emerge, but now appears to 
have been abandoned, the third stage 
could he shorter if circumstances per-
mit. The Committee considered this 
possibility - already discussed in the 
Green Paper- and expressed its firm 
opposition
7 to any variation in the 
established programmes. The length of 
the various stages should be decided by 
the Council by 30 June 1998 at the lat-
est; the decision should also establish 
that it will not he subject to subse-
quent modification. The market needs 
5  Particularly worthy of note is  the intention to 
define the concept of "legal  instrument": laws,  reg-
ulations, administrative decisions, court rulings, 
contracts, payment instruments other than ban-
knotes and coins, and other instruments with legal 
effect. 
6  Article 1  09](  4) 
7  Op.cit. (footnote 2), paragraphs 5.1.2. and 5.3.2. 
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certainty in order to programme the 
numerous, complex and costly changes 
which will become necessary. 
4.3.  The reasons for considering the 
possibility of reducing the length of the 
third stage are clear. This period was 
dictated by the time required for the 
central banks to put new banknotes 
and coins into circulation. It would 
appear that deadlines could be short-
ened if the central banks are able to 
speed up their preparations. The mar-
ket could possibly adjust to a short 
period (although this is pure conjec-
ture), but only on the condition that 
once its duration has been decided, no 
further changes are possible. 
4.4.  One of the more noteworthy 
transitional provisions is  that the Euro 
will be subdivided, in accordance with 
the conversion rates, into national cur-
rency units, which will retain the pre-
sent subdivisions. The monetary laws of 
the individual countries will remain in 
force, in tandem with the provisions of 
the Council Regulation. These rules 
require no particular comment. 
4.5.  The "no  compulsion, no prohibi-
tion" rule 
4.5.1. The Green Paper indicated that 
the use of the Euro for current market 
purposes during the transitional period 
should be optional. The Committee 
stressed that this principle should be 
adopted without exception, highlight-
ing that "every contracting party 
[should be given]  the option to accept 
payment in currency other than nation-
al  currency". It was accepted by the 
Madrid Council that the market should 
be free  to decide, summed up in the 
expression  ''no  obligation, no prohibi-
tion".  No document or communication 
appears to question this. 
4.5.2. The Regulation would, at first 
sight, appear to be based on this view. 
The basic rule establishes that legal 
instruments stipulating the use of the 
national currency or the Euro must 
effectively be executed in the currency 
selected in advance, except where 
agreed otherwise by the contracting 
parties. In other words, it will be up to 
the parties to decide in which currency 
the contract will be executed. The 
Committee fully supports this measure, 
which it had itself called for. 
4.5.3. As it currently stands, the draft 
Regulation provides for a derogation: 
any debt payable by a credit for 
account of the creditor, and expressed 
in Euro or a national currency, may be 
discharged in either of the two curren-
cies, at the debtor's choice. The creditor 
will receive payment in the currency of 
his own account, with conversion at the 
fixed rates. 
4.5.4. This "derogation" is  clearly of 
such a scope as  to become the guiding 
rule. Although absurd, the derogation 
would concern, if anything, only cash 
transactions: in effect it is  irrelevant, 
since as  there are as yet no Euro ban-
knotes, these transactions can only be 
settled in a national currency. The ''no 
compulsion, no prohibition" principle is 
in practice abandoned in favour of the 
opposite principle:  ''choice for the 
debtor,  compulsion for the creditor". 
4.5.5. If the above principle is  finally 
adopted, the dispute which will arise in 
the event that the creditor is unable to 
accept a payment in Euros will have to 
be settled by the courts. One example 
would be that of retailers and service 
providers, confronted with a request to 
settle credit card payments in Euros 
effected with a credit to the seller's 
account. If their terminals and payment facilities were not yet in a position to 
deal with the new currency, or to oper-
ate in two currencies, such transactions 
would become impossible. 
4.5.6. In general terms, the option 
extended to creditors means, from the 
outset, an obligation upon companies 
and in particular the banking and 
financial sector to carry out innumer-
able conversions or to practice double-
entry accounting throughout the peri-
od, something the Green Paper itself 
considered technically and economically 
inadvisable. 
4.5.7. The underlying reasons for the 
rule in question are perfectly valid; it is 
only the wording which appears clumsy 
and should be redrafted. It has been 
realized, in examining the actual situa-
tion - ascertained by the Commission 
in the course of its numerous meetings 
with businesses - that the market can 
only adjust to the Single Currency 
gradually; accounting in two currencies 
is  costly and often - especially at the 
beginning of the period - completely 
impracticable. The rule is intended to 
take account of this fact, but its conse-
quences may outstrip its intentions. 
4.5.8. In the light of the above, the 
Committee suggests deleting the rule 
referred to in point 4.5.3 above and 
replacing it with another providing 
that monetary debts payable by a cred-
it for account of the creditor may be 
discharged by the debtor in either 
Euros or national currency, subject to 
the agreement of the creditor and of 
the financial institution where the 
account is held. This is  the only way 
for the "no compulsion, no prohibi-
tion" principle - which should apply to 
all operators - to be upheld; it also 
accords with actual practice. 
4.6.  The organized markets 
4.6.1. The gradual shift to the single 
currency entails planning internal tech-
nical and organizational measures on 
the part of the financial institutions. It 
should also be borne in mind that the 
financial sector works in a closely inter-
dependent fashion: each institution 
conducts its relations with the others in 
accordance with dearly-established 
rules, which are essential to the sector's 
operation. The legislation under exami-
nation takes account of the concept of 
"organized markets" and lays down the 
rules needed to avoid disruption during 
the switch-over from the national to the 
single currency. 
4.6.2. The Regulation understands 
"organized markets" to be markets set 
up for swaps, clearance or settlement of 
the financial instruments listed in Sec-
tion B of the Annex to Direc-
tive 93/22/EEC on investment services, 
and including swaps, clearance and set-
tlement of payment instruments. 
4.6.3. It will be in the clear interests of 
all organized markets to move to the 
single currency as  rapidly as  possible, 
although at the same time, they will 
have to take account of the capacity of 
their individual members to adjust to 
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the new rules in an ordered and, most 
importantly, coordinated way. With a 
view to this requirement, the Council 
Regulation would provide an arrange-
ment whereby the Member States will 
be able to take appropriate measures to 
allow the organized markets to take 
the necessary decisions for the 
changeover from the national to the 
single currency. 
4.6.4. The Committee fully supports 
this measure which reflects the neces-
sary pragmatism and an acknowledge-
ment of the circumstances in which 
each national organized market oper-
ates. This fails  to resolve, however, the 
question of international organized 
markets whose operating base is  located 
in a Member State - not necessarily par-
ticipating in EMU- but whose mem-
bers also belong to other Member 
States, whether or not participating in 
EMU. The Committee calls for specific 
rules to be devised to cover this aspect. 
4.6.5. The Committee believes that: 
•  the rules adopted by a market regu-
lated by provisions made by the 
Member State in which it is  based 
apply to all its members, whether or 
not resident in the European  Union; 
•  where an organized market is  based 
in a country not participating in 
EMU, but whose members are 
based in participating countries, the 
Member State in question should 
avoid adopting measures which 
would hamper voluntary use of the 
Euro. 
4.7.  Legal measures to be adopted by 
the Member States 
4.7.1. The Regulation under discussion 
apparently intends to leave Member 
States broad freedom of  action in rela-
tion to their own markets. Allowance 
for national requirements should, how-
ever,  be tempered by compliance with 
the common principles which are need-
ed for a harmonized changeover in the 
various countries. The Committee 
endorses this approach, but at the same 
time would draw attention to the need 
- already alluded to in paragraph 4.5.2, 
also to take explicit account of cases 
where national rules might affect insti-
tutions or organized markets of other 
Member States. 
4. 7.2. One general rule is  that national 
regulations must comply with the 
timetable to be drawn up by the Coun-
cil. In the Committee's view,  this rule is 
necessary but probably not sufficient: a 
degree of  coordination of actions will 
be essential if excessive discrepancies in 
implementing the measures adopted in 
each country are to be avoided. 
4.7.3. The need for coordination dis-
cussed above becomes all the more evi-
dent given that the Member States will 
have to take the necessary measures to 
redenominate government stock in cir-
culation. Moreover, the Member States 
will have to allow the bodies directing 
the organized markets to take the deci-
sions necessary for the adoption of the 
Euro as  the unit of account. Here also, 
excessive discrepancies in implementa-
tion periods for these measures in dif-
ferent countries and markets could 
unsettle the markets. 
4.7.4. National legal provisions permit-
ting or imposing netting or other pro-
cedures of similar effect must apply to 
money liabilities expressed in Euros or 
national currency. Conversion will be 
carried out on the basis of the parities 
set. The same applies to the presenta-
tion of company accounts. These rules 
conform to Treaty rules and require no 
special comment. 4.7.5. It has also been confirmed that 
national banknotes and coins will 
retain their capacity as a legal means of 
payment only within current national 
boundaries, remaining subject to the 
national monetary legislation of the 
country in question. The Committee 
notes the decision, which is in compli-
ance with the Treaty. 
5.  Rounding-!lff when converting 
5.1.  One basic rule to be laid down 
by the Regulation is  the number of 
decimal figures to be used in convert-
ing. The Commission seems to be lean-
ing towards the following conversion 
rules: 
a.  the conversion rates will be calculat-
ed to six significant figures, and will 
not be subject to rounding-off; 
b.  the monetary amounts to be paid or 
calculated when converting a 
national currency to Euros will be 
rounded off to the nearest hun-
dredth; for conversion from Euros 
to national currency, rounding-off 
will be to the nearest decimal sub-
division or unit, depending on 
national practice. If  application of 
the rule results in an exactly half-
way figure,  the sum will be rounded 
up to the nearest hundredth or unit, 
as appropriate. 
5.1.1. These rules are simple and follow 
earlier practice and logic, particularly 
decimalization of the pound sterling. 
Various problems in terms of law and 
application arise, some of which are 
already being examined by the Com-
mission and the EMI. 
5.2.  It should be explicitly established 
-however obvious it may be- that in 
the case of  companies, especially finan-
cial institutions, the appl cable rule is 
that each individual amo  nt shall be 
converted using calculati  ns based on 
six significant figures an  rounded off 
in accordance with the p  cedures set 
out in paragraph 4.7.1 b. above. In this 
case, the total of the num rous amounts 
in national currency,  conv rted into 
Euros, may not correspo  d precisely to 
the total in Euros of the i  dividual 
amounts converted. Seve  tens of  sam-
ple calculations have con  rmed the law 
of  large numbers:  for prac ical purposes, 
the differences are neglig ble, with 
rounding-up or -down b  ancing each 
other. 
5.3.  It follows that use  f six signifi-
cant figures followed by r  unding-of£ 
in accordance with the rues provided, 
entails neither appreciabl  losses nor 
gains. In other words, th  conversion 
rules are "neutral" as far  s markets and 
individual operators are c  ncerned. The 
Committee supports the  niform adop-
tion of these rules for all  he Member 
States. 
5.4.  It should however  e borne in 
mind that many organize  markets may 
rapidly adopt the Euro as  their currency 
of  account while enablin  their mem-
bers to keep the national  urrency m 
their dealings with their  n business 
partners. In this case, the  mounts cal-
culated in national curre  cy will be 
converted into Euros by  he organized 
market and then reconver ed into 
national currency for the  urposes of 
recording payment or de ring transac-
tions. Matters are further  omplicated 
when inward and outwar  sums are in 
two different currencies,  oth partici-
pating in EMU. If the sys  em is  to 
work, it is essential in the interests of 
accounting corresponden e,  that exactly 
the same sum is calculate  inwards and 
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outwards. This correspondence is prac-
tically impossible to secure, particularly 
if the sums in question are considerable 
(see point A of the Appendix). 
5. 5.  The Committee is of the view 
that uniform rules must be adopted to 
ensure accounting agreement of trans-
actions. The organized markets should 
therefore be left free to establish rules 
in this field;  these rules would be valid 
for all their members. Alternatively, 
they should be drawn up by the Coun-
cil Regulation although this solution 
would not be simple to put into prac-
tice since it could not take account of 
the varying features and wide range of 
needs of the national and international 
organized markets. 
5.6.  A point of considerable impor-
tance needs to be made at this juncture: 
operations using six significant figures 
and rounding-off operations are readily 
executed by suitably programmed com-
puters and personal computers (PCs), 
but not by desk calculators with either 
printers or digital displays, by cash reg-
isters with built-in conversion pro-
grammes, or by pocket calculators: the 
limited number of digits (usually no 
more than twelve)  they can display 
rules out any calculation. This means 
that those operators not equipped with 
electronic data processors or PCs will 
have to replace their existing equip-
ment, which cannot be adjusted to the 
new requirements, with entirely new 
equipment. The same applies to con-
sumers wishing to check whether prices 
correspond with ordinary pocket calcu-
lators. 
5.7.  Replacement of desk calculators, 
cash registers and pocket calculators 
with models in line with the new 
requirements could represent a new, 
worthwhile market for manufacturers. 
There is  no way of knowing how many 
such items are in use, but some tens of 
millions seems a reasonable estimate. 
On the other hand, replacement costs 
would constitute an additional cost of 
switching to the single currency for the 
market and for individuals, the total 
amount of  which would be far from 
negligible. 
5.8.  The above comments raise prob-
lems which the legislator cannot ignore 
or underestimate. Consumers, as well 
as  retailers and service providers, need 
clear,  readily implemented and moni-
tored rules, based on criteria of equity 
for both parties. Adherence to the "six 
significant figures"  rule, with the conse-
quent rounding-off, is  clearly not avail-
able to all. There is  a real risk of pro-
voking public resistance to the Single 
Currency at a time when current and 
planned campaigns seek to obtain the 
reverse. The Committee urges careful 
consideration of these needs and the 
adoption of rules appropriate to market 
requirements (see point B of the 
Appendix). 
5. 9.  The Council Regulation should 
therefore include a specific reference to 
retail trade and services; acting on the 
basis of the principle of subsidiarity, the 
Member States should then devise 
appropriate simplified rules for con-
verting their currencies into Euros. 
5.10.  A further comment is  required 
concerning conversion between partici-
pating currencies: under Treaty 
Article 1091 (  4), the Council will estab-
lish only the conversion rate into Euros 
for each individual participating curren-
cy,  but not the rate for converting each 
of them into each other one. The Regu-
lation provides that this conversion 
shall be carried out on the basis of an 
algorithm comprising the conversion of the original sum into Euros, with at 
least three decimal figures, and the 
reconversion of the latter sum into the 
other national currency. Given that the 
conversion rates of the national curren-
cies are fixed,  why should not the 
Council itself- or the ECB, by appro-
priate delegation - set and impose the 
conversion rates between the various 
currencies, calculated on the basis of 
the algorithm mentioned above? 
6.  Banknotes and coins in Euros 
6.1.  Legal tender in Euros and 
national currencies 
6.1.1. The Regulation provides that 
banknotes in Euros shall be issued - or 
rather, put into circulation - at the end 
of the transitional period by the ECB 
and the central banks of the participat-
ing countries. According to the Regula-
tion, these notes should be the only 
legal tender in the countries in ques-
tion. The same rules would apply to 
coins, subject to the reservation that 
no-one could be obliged to accept more 
than fifty coins for any single payment. 
6.1.2. The draft Regulation's Final Pro-
visions establish that national ban-
knotes and coins would cease to be 
legal tender six months after the end of 
the transitional period. This period 
could be made shorter in each Member 
State through national legislation. 
6.1.3. The fact that banknotes and 
coins in Euros will be legal tender with 
effect from the end of the transitional 
period - in fact,  1 January 2002 - and 
that national banknotes and coins will 
cease to be legal tender six months later 
- 30 June 2002 - means that for a max-
imum of six months (or possibly less  in 
some countries) legal tender will be 
expressed in two different ways: the 
Euro for all  participating countries, and 
the relevant national currency - a subdi-
vision of the Euro, see paragraph 3.1. -
valid only in the country of issue. 
6.1.4. Although the situation outlined 
in the previous paragraph is  from the 
legal point of  view quite unexception-
able, in practice the public would tend 
to regard the Euro and the national cur-
rency as  two separate legal tender cur-
rencies. There are some precedents: the 
Scottish pound, the Belgian franc and 
the Luxembourg franc, but with the 
difference that these currencies contin-
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ue to circulate without a cut-off  date.  In 
order to avoid disturbance, the market 
should be clearly informed that the two 
currencies are of  equal legal value. 
There should thus be no rush to central 
banks and commercial banks during 
the first days of issue by members of 
the public wishing to change national 
currency into Euros immediately. All 
countries have successful experience of 
exchanging new models of national 
banknotes and coins for types which 
are being withdrawn from circulation. 
6.2.  Forgery and counterfeiting 
6.2.1. In accordance with one develop-
ing line of thought, the Council Regu-
lation would restrict itself to obliging 
the Member States to provide appro-
priate sanctions against forgery and 
counterfeiting of banknotes. The 
Committee would point out, in this 
regard, that point 136 of the Green 
Paper stated that "it would fall  to the 
Commission in conjunction with the 
ESCB (European System of Central 
Banks) to make legislative proposals 
[on]  the legal protection of banknotes 
against counterfeiting". Both the Green 
Paper and, apparently, the Council 
Regulation, have however omitted to 
consider that the placing in circulation 
of counterfeit money should also be 
covered by the law. 
6.2.2. It has therefore been seen that 
the necessary protection of a shared 
asset, the single currency, could not be 
left to the initiative of the individual 
Member States. Although criminal law 
is  the exclusive preserve of the Member 
States, equally the common interest 
cannot be protected in different ways 
from country to country. The princi-
ple of subsidiarity cannot be invoked 
here, not even in terms of the criminal 
law argument. 
6.2.3. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee considers it essential that the 
Commission and Council devise a 
legally valid solution to extend ade-
quate protection to the single currency 
through measures which all  the partici-
pating Member States will be obliged to 
adopt. Purely "national" solutions 
would not be enough and could even 
prove counterproductive: countries 
with "softer" laws would become a 
haven for counterfeiters and their dis-
tributors. 
6.2.4. The Committee proposed a solu-
tion in its Opinion on the Green Paper 
(paragraphs 7.10 to 7.14), which it 
here reiterates: the adoption of an inno-
vative and politically acceptable 
approach by all the Member States. 
Measures to counter forgery and coun-
terfeiting of the single currency should 
be considered as an element in the fight 
against organized crime: in effect, the 
same approach as was adopted with the 
money laundering directive. The Com-
mittee highlighted a fact which is well-
known to all the police forces of the 
world: these offences are never commit-
ted by isolated individuals. The forgery 
and counterfeiting (together with circu-
lation) of bank notes - and coins - is a 
monopoly of criminal organizations, 
almost always international, with 
impressive resources at their disposal, 
which are frequently connected with 
other organizations involved in drug 
trafficking and money laundering. 6.2.5. The Committee also proposed 
that the new legislation should be of 
comprehensive scope, and cover means 
of payment which substitute or consti-
tute money (payment cards, pre-paid 
cards, travellers' cheques, etc.). These 
means now account for a considerable 
proportion of the currency in circula-
tion, and their acceptance depends 
entirely on the confidence which the 
public places in them. They too are 
Brussels, 31  October 1996. 
The President 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Tom Jenkins 
helping to give new strength to the 
international criminal gangs. Although 
the sanctions for offences against pri-
vate assets cannot be the same as those 
for offences against public assets, both 
types of  offence have the same impact 
on society - namely a growing threat 
to the common good and a strength-
ening of organized crime. 
The Secretary-General 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Adriano Graziosi 
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APPENDIX 
A.  Ref.  Paragraph 5.4. 
A simple example would be that of a 
relatively modest amount in Belgian 
francs. 
Assuming that the conversion rate is 
fixed at Euro 1 = BEF 38.7747, calcula-
tion the other way gives BEF  100 = 
Euro 2.57900. BEF  10 million would 
be the equivalent of Euro 257,900.00; 
applying the fixed conversion rate of 
38.7747 to this sum produces 
BEF 9,999,995.10. The difference-
BEF 4.90 over 10 million- is  minimal 
but becomes significant given that the 
sums involved on the monetary and 
financial markets are enormous. In any 
case,  the important point is accounting 
correspondence, which demands that 
the figures tally precisely. 
B.  Ref.  Paragraph 5.8. 
This can be illustrated with two exam-
ples, based on the notional Belgian 
franc parity used in point A: 
•  amounts in BEF to be converted 
into Euros, five decimal figures 
(2.57900): 
BEF  1,050 = Euro 27.0795- round-
ed up to 27.08 
BEF 2,680 = Euro 69.1172 - round-
ed up to 69.12 
•  amounts in BEF to be converted 
into Euros, two decimal figures 
rounded up (2.58): 
BEF  1,050 = Euro 27.09 
BEF 2,680 = Euro 69.14 
The differences between the amounts 
rounded up under the two methods 
range from 0.03°/o and 0.04o/o,  practi-
cally meaningless from the inflationary 
angle. ,fmpaat:  ofEcQnPmic and  Mon~tt~ry f/nion;r 
Economic and  social aspeats of  convergenae· 
and measures  .. to increase awareness 
of  the single currency 
Rapporteur:  Umberto BURANI (Italie- Employers) 
Co-rapporteurs :  Bernard de Bigault du Granrut (France- Various Interests) 
Michael Geuenich (Germany- Workers) 
Opinion adopted on 26 September 1996 
1.  Preliminary comments 
1.1.  Following a request from the 
Commission, the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopted an Opinion on 26 
October 1995
1
,  on the Green Paper on 
the practical arrangements for the intro-
duction of  the single currencf. The pre-
sent Opinion should be regarded as 
complementary to the latter Opinion in 
which the ESC considered the technical 
problems of introducing the single cur-
rency.  In the present ESC will look in 
greater detail at the consequences of a 
single currency, going beyond the prac-
tical problems of its introduction. 
1.2.  The ESC welcomes the planned 
introduction of monetary union in 
Europe. This has been made clear on a 
number of occasions. The ESC notes 
with concern, however, that as the 
deadline for entry to the third stage of 
Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) draws closer, more and more 
questions are being raised by the public. 
Many Europeans regard renunciation of 
their national currency as a high price 
to pay, even if the ultimate objective, 
which enjoys general support, is closer 
European integration. The high degree 
of scepticism in some quarters can be 
attributed, inter alia, to a continuing 
lack of publicly available information. 
Against this background the ESC con-
siders it appropriate to stress once 
again, at the beginning of this Opinion, 
the advantages of EMU for the prosper-
ity of Europe's citizens. 
1.2.1. The most important aspect of 
EMU is  the disappearance of exchange-
OJ C 18, 22.1.1996. 
2  COM(95) 333 final,  31.5.1995. 
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rate fluctuations. This will remove a 
major barrier to trade and investment 
in the European Union. In this connec-
tion, the ESC endorses the analysis pro-
vided in the Commission document\ 
"The Impact of Currency Fluctuations 
on the Internal Market", particularly its 
conclusion that the single currency, as 
the indispensable complement to the 
single market, will: 
•  eliminate internal currency fluctua-
tions, which are a source of major 
economic problems; 
•  make possible greater convergence 
using the machinery provided for by 
the EC Treaty. 
1.2.2. In addition, the forecast growth 
in investment should be accompanied 
by a more efficient and rational distrib-
ution of investment and employment in 
the single market. This would greatly 
amplify the positive effects on growth 
and employment of the establishment 
of the single market. 
1.2.3. The disappearance of national 
currencies will also eliminate the need 
for expensive rate-fixing and exchange 
costs, with resultant benefits for the 
production, trade and services sectors. 
1.2.4. The higher level of inegration of 
the common capital market will make 
the single currency a more significant 
counterweight to the US dollar and the 
yen, and will cause it to grow in impor-
tance as a reserve currency. Investors in 
search of international diversification 
may be expected to increase the weight-
ing of the "euro" in their portfolios. 
Higher capital imports will benefit the 
currency itself and real interest rates. A 
stable currency and the associated 
lower financing costs are important 
preconditions for more investment, 
growth and employment. 
1.2.5. From a more general point of 
view,  the combined effect of the intro-
duction of the single currency and the 
completion of the single market will 
enable the EU, by the beginning of the 
21" Century, to be one of the top three 
or four economic and political powers 
at world level.  No European state, by 
itself, could achieve such a position of 
influence. 
1.2.6. The single currency will make it 
easier to compare prices on goods and 
factor markets across national frontiers. 
This does not mean that the price of a 
homogeneous good will be the same on 
all  European markets. But relative price 
changes will be more easily discernible. 
This will guarantee the efficient use of 
available resources. The EU's prosperity 
will increase. 
1.2.7. It is  also expected that the cre-
ation of a single currency area will 
make monetary policy more effective. 
Initial empirical studies
4 indicate that 
aggregate monetary demand in Europe 
is  more stable than demand for the 
national components of the aggregate. 
1.3.  Thus, EMU will offer far-reach-
ing opportunities. Hasty and ill-pre-
pared implementation, on the other 
hand, could be dangerous. Once the 
third stage of EMU enters into force 
the currency merger will be irreversible. 
It is  therefore important in the run-up 
to monetary union to discuss all rele-
vant problems and to establish the best 
possible framework for the common 
economic area and relations between 
3  COM(95) 503 final,  31.10.1995. 
4  SeeM. Falk and N. Funke, The Stability of 
Money Demand in Germany and in the EMS: 
Impact of German Unification, in: 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 131  (3), pp.  470-488. this area and the citizen. In view of the 
many questions which the single cur-
rency raises, this draft Opinion focuses 
on a few key issues. The choice of sub-
jects for discussion reflects the social 
interests represented at the ESC. More 
detailed consideration is also given to a 
number of subjects for which closer 
examination was shown to be desirable 
in the light of the Opinion on the 
Green Paper. The following aspects of 
monetary union are developed in 
greater detail: 
•  interpretation and application of the 
convergence criteria laid down in 
the EC Treaty (Section 2); 
•  establishment of conversion rates 
(Section 3); 
•  starting date for monetary union 
(Section 4); 
•  position of the future European 
Central Bank (Section 5); 
•  derogation Member States: econom-
ic considerations and monetary 
cooperation (Section 6); 
•  consequences of monetary union for 
the labour market (Section 7); 
•  measures to be taken in the field of 
communications (Section 8). 
2.  The convergence criteria -
interpretation and application 
2.1.  The establishment of a common 
monetary area is economically desirable 
if economies which have attained a sim-
ilar level of development merge. In gen-
eral, the suitability of a region for par-
ticipation in a common currency 
depends on its ability to react flexibly 
and homogeneously to exogenous 
shocks. When economies of a similar 
level of development are merged, coun-
tries will enjoy the advantages of  a sin-
gle currency - primarily increased 
investment, growth and employment. 
If,  however, economies with different 
levels of development are merged, the 
disappearance of flexible exchange rates 
can be disadvantageous. The countries 
which do not satisfY the real conver-
gence criteria run the risk, as will be 
seen below, of not being able to keep 
pace with the others and of losing 
(export) market shares to economically 
stronger regions for a time. The result 
would be more under-employment in 
the economically weaker regions. The 
resulting large disparities in regional 
income structures would carry the risk 
of social and political tensions in the 
common monetary area. Large financial 
transfers would be needed to maintain 
social peace. As a result of external eco-
nomic integration, a secondary effect 
would be that loss of demand in the 
weaker economies would impact nega-
tively on growth in the central region. 
2.2.  These considerations are reflect-
ed in the EC Treaty. The convergence 
criteria laid down in Article 109j(l) (see 
box) will be used to determine which 
Member States will be among the first 
to participate in monetary union. In 
view of the observations made in point 
2.1., the ESC thinks that a broad-brush 
approach to the scope for interpretation 
allowed by the Treaty would not be 
without problems. 
2.3.  The question thus arises as  to 
how the convergence criteria are to be 
interpreted in practice. Phrases such as 
"substantially and continuously" and 
"sufficiently diminishing", used in the 
EC Treaty, leave a great deal of scope 
for interpretation. The ESC therefore 
calls on the Council to clarifY the con-
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Convergence criteriafor participation 
in Economic and Monetary Union 
•  Price stability 
The average rate of inflattuu, ooserved over a period of one year before the 
examination, may not exceed by more than lfi percentagefoints that of,  at 
most, the three best performing Member States in terms o  price stability. 
•  Public finances 
-The ratio of the government deficit to GOP (deficit ratio) may not 
exceed 3<1!)  unless the ratio has declined substantially and continuously 
and reached a level  that comes close to the reference value, or, alrernative-
ly,  the excess over the reference value is  only exceptional and temporary 
and the ratio remains close to the reference value. 
l 
-The ratio of government debt to GOP (government debt ratio)  may not 
exceed 600Jc),  unless the ratio is  sufficiently diminishing and approaching 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace. 
•  Exchange rate stability 
Participation in the normal EMS fluctuation margins without severe tensions 
for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Mem-
ber State may nor have devalued its currency's bilateral rate against any other 
Member State's currency on its own initiative for the same period. 
•  Interest rate stability 
Observed over a period of one year before the examination, a Member State 
must have had an average nominal long-term interest rate (long-term govern-
ment debt issues)  that does not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that 
of:  at most, the three best performing Member States in  terms of price stabili--
ty. 
l  ____ __ _ vergence criteria before entry to mone-
tary union. This would have the advan-
tage of giving governments clear targets. 
It would also prevent excessively lax, 
political interpretation of the entry cri-
teria. This is  a real danger, given that 
admission to monetary union requires a 
qualified majority in the European 
Council (at present 62 out of 87 votes). 
Thus, countries which will themselves 
probably not qualify for monetary 
union, will be required to approve the 
entry of other Member States. 
2.4.  The ESC feels  that the conver-
gence criteria need to be clarified in a 
number of respects. Thus, it is  not clear 
from the text of the Treaty whether the 
price criterion applies to the average, or 
the worst value of the three most stable 
currencies. In order to provide a more 
precise definition the ESC suggests that 
the price criterion be regarded as ful-
filled if the average inflation rate does 
not exceed by more than lfi percentage 
points the GDP-weighted average infla-
tion rate of the three best performing 
Member States. 
2.5.  The ESC also sees a need for 
clarification of the price criterion 
because of its relationship to the inter-
est criterion. It is hoped that, as  a result 
of the creation of the European single 
currency area, the participating 
economies will benefit from perma-
nently lower average EU interest rates. 
This expectation is primarily justified 
by the greater depth of the capital mar-
ket in the future European currency 
area. The maintenance of  lower interest 
rates is a precondition for higher invest-
ment in Europe and hence for boosting 
employment. The resultant gains in 
productivity and international competi-
tiveness are expected to fuel higher  5 
investment and employment. 
2.6.  The exchange-rate criterion also 
needs clarification. On 2 August 1993 
the fluctuation margins were widened 
from +1-2.25°/o to +l-15o/o. The new, 
wider fluctuation margins take account 
of the massive increase in capital mobil-
ity over recent years and the consequent 
high degree of  volatility on the currency 
markets. The adjustment of the fluctua-
tion margins was also intended to 
deprive the markets of an easy target for 
speculative attack. This has proved suc-
cessful, as shown by the deviation indi-
cator. This indicator shows whether the 
behaviour of a currency participating in 
the intervention system is deviating sig-
nificantly from that of the other partici-
pating currencies5• With market volatili-
ty virtually unchanged, the indicator is 
showing much less violent fluctuations. 
And finally,  many EMS currencies were 
able to return to their old fluctuation 
margins within a short time of the 
widening of the margins. 
2.6.1. At +l-15o/o,  the limits beyond 
which adjustment of the bilateral cen-
tral rate is  required are so wide that 
speculation has become a much less sig-
nificant factor in exchange-rate move-
ments. Fundamentals now play a com-
paratively more important role. This 
has made it easier for fundamentally 
"healthy" currencies to remain within 
the narrow +l-2.25o/o fluctuation mar-
gin. A currency's ability to remain with-
in a narrow margin around the central 
rate can be regarded as a criterion for 
entry to monetary union. The ESC 
therefore feels  that the following 
approach could be adopted to the mon-
See Deutsche Bundesbank, Devisenkursstatistik, 
May 1995, statistical appendix to monthly report 
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itoring of convergence. Whilst formally 
retaining the enlarged +I -15°/o fluctua-
tion margins, the exchange-rate criteri-
on should be regarded as fulfilled if, 
during the two years prior to entry to 
the third stage of monetary union, no 
adjustments have been made to a cur-
rency's bilateral central rate and if,  dur-
ing the final year before the examina-
tion, the currency has remained within 
a sufficiently narrow fluctuation margin 
relative to the bilateral central rate. It 
will be for the Council of Ministers to 
define the expression "sufficiently nar-
row" when assessing convergence. The 
ESC, however, thinks that a value 
which takes account of (a)  actual eco-
nomic conditions and (b)  the principle 
of observing competitive neutrality 
should be fixed. 
2.7.  Clarification of the government 
deficit and government debt ratio crite-
rion poses the greatest political prob-
lem. The wording of the EC Treaty 
leaves considerable scope for interpreta-
tion. 
2. 7 .I. The provisions of  Article 1  04c in 
respect of  government deficits state that 
Member States shall avoid excessive 
government deficits. 
2. 7 .2.  Paragraph 2 goes on to define the 
way this policy is  to be implemented, as 
follows: 
((  The Commission shall monitor the 
development of  the budgetary situation 
and of  the stock of  government debt in 
the Member States with a view to 
identifying gross errors.  In particular it 
shall examine compliance with bud-
getary discipline on the basis of  the fol-
lowing two criteria: 
a)  whether the ratio of  the planned or 
actual government deficit to gross 
domestic product exceeds a 
reference value,  unless 
- either the ratio has declined sub-
stantially and continuously and 
reached a level that comes close to 
the reference value; 
- or,  alternatively,  the excess over 
the reference value is only excep-
tional and temporary and the ratio 
remains close to the reference value; 
b)  whether the ratio of  government 
debt to gross domestic product 
exceeds a reference value,  unless the 
ratio is sufficiently diminishing 
and approachin$ the reference 
value at a satisfactory pace. 
The reference values are specified in 
the Protocol on the excessive deficit 
procedure annexed to  this Treaty. " 
2.7.3. Protocol No. 5 to the Treaty 
defines and spells out (Article 1)  the ref-
erence values referred to in Treaty Arti-
cle  104c(2). 
''  3% for the ratio of  the planned or 
actual government deficit to gross  · 
domestic product at market prices; 
60% for the ratio of  government 
debt to gross domestic product at mar-
ket prices. " 
2.7.4. Protocol No 5 defines (Article 2) 
what is  meant by  ((government",  ((deficit': 
((investment" and ((debt" and confirms 
(Article 3)  that governments are respon-
sible for the deficits of ((general govern-
ment'~ 
2.7.5. Paragraphs 3 to 14 of  Article 
1  04c give details of the procedure for 
Commission, Council and Parliament 
monitoring of government deficits. A 
timetable for the completion of Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union is given in 
Article 1  09e of the EC Treaty. With the 
exception of paragraphs 1, 9,  11  and 14, Article 1  04c is applicable from the 
start of the second phase of completion 
of EMU. 
2. 7.6. Consequently, should any Mem-
ber State fail  to comply with the criteria 
regarding government deficits or debts 
for purposes of transition to the third 
phase, the Commission is  to prepare a 
report (Paragraph 3). A committee, 
provided for in Article 1  09c, delivers an 
opinion on this Commission report 
(Paragraph 4). If the Commission con-
siders that a Member State's deficit is 
excessive, it addresses an opinion to the 
Council which shall, under paragraph 
6,  "acting by a qualified majority on a 
recommendation from the Commission, 
and having considered any observations 
which the Member State concerned may 
wish to  make, decide after an overall 
assessment whether an excessive deficit 
exists." 
2.7.7. A joint reading of these texts 
shows that it is  not absolutely necessary, 
when determining whether Member 
States meet the conditions to join the 
Monetary Union, for the ratio between 
government deficit and GDP to be 
under 3°/o. It is sufficient for: 
the ratio to have declined substan-
tially and continuously and to have 
reached a level that comes close to 
the reference value, 
or for the excess over the reference 
value to be only exceptional and 
temporary and for the ratio to 
remain close to the reference value. 
2.7.8. The ''substantial and continuous" 
nature of the decrease, the proximity to 
the "reference value" and the "exceptional 
and temporary excess" are matters for the 
Council to appraise (deciding by a 
qualified majority of its members' votes, 
weighted in accordance with Article 
148(2), excluding the votes of the rep-
resentative of the Member State con-
cerned). The Council then decides 
"after an overall assessment" (Paragraph 
6) whether or not an excessive deficit 
exists. 
2.7.9. The reference to an  ''overall assess-
ment" gives  the Council a margin of 
appraisal which is  not defined in any 
text. The Council should be able to 
take account of the date on which the 
Treaty of  Maastricht was signed, viz.  7 
February 1992 - at which time the eco-
nomic situation in the signatory States 
differed significantly from the situation 
which will prevail on the date when the 
Council takes its decision. As a result, 
the values specified in Protocol No. 5, 
namely a government deficit of  3°/o  and 
a government debt of  60o/o of GDP, are 
not hard and fast limits and the Coun-
cil has a substantial, sovereign margin 
of appraisal, deciding by a qualified 
majority. 
2.7.10.  At the time the Treaty was 
drafted, the signatory states clearly real-
ized that the European economy, like 
the world economy or individual 
national economies, was in the throes 
of constant change, determined by fac-
tors beyond the Member States' con-28 
trol. The Member States therefore 
decided (over six years prior to imple-
mentation of these Treaty provisions) 
against fixed and inflexible convergence 
criteria as  regards reference values. Oth-
erwise the provisions envisaged could 
well have proved inapplicable. 
2.7.11.  In the light of the foregoing, it 
now seems necessary for all parties 
again to focus on the goal of these pro-
visions, namely the introduction of a 
single currency for the EU Member 
States. The feasibility of this venture is 
conditioned far more by the ''real con-
vergence" of the various economies than 
by the "binding" force of criteria. 
2.7.12.  In the same context, the ESC 
would point out that an approach based 
on Council Decisions certainly does 
not mean that the precise overall 
assessment criteria can be ignored in 
h  ,f.' ,1'{;  "  "  t  e context o 1  e 11orts to create a  strong 
currency. On the contrary, it would 
stress that the goal of convergence must 
be regarded as  an indispensable objec-
tive. 
2.7.13.  The deficit ratio should also be 
interpreted in like manner. In the ESC's 
view, this ratio could be said to be close 
to  the reference value if it exceeds this 
value by no more than 1 percentage 
point. The deficit ratio could be said to 
have declined substantially and continu-
ously if it has fallen for three years in 
succession. And a deficit could be said 
to be exceptional and temporary if it 
exceeds the reference value only for the 
duration of a cyclical downswing. The 
government debt criterion should be 
quantified in such a way that the results 
of earlier convergence monitoring do 
not have to be revised retrospectively. A 
case in point is Ireland, which in 1995 
was found by the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers to have made suf-
ficient progress on reducing its govern-
ment-debt ratio. 
2.8.  Member States wishing to take 
part in EMU must pursue a strict con-
vergence policy. The Council will at all 
events make a political interpretation of 
the convergence criteria when deciding 
on whether Member States are to be 
admitted to the third stage of EMU. 
Too small a group of Member States 
would not justifY the high costs associ-
ated with introduction of a single cur-
rency. 
2.9.  In this connection, the question 
arises as  to whether exclusive concentra-
tion on monetary, budgetary and debt 
criteria makes for an optimum selection 
process. The ESC feels  that, in order to 
broaden the circle of participants to an 
economically more viable number, a 
further examination should be carried 
out on the basis of appropriate criteria. 
This should be done, however, only 
after a rigorous examination on the 
basis of the criteria laid down in Article 
109j(l), and then only with respect to 
countries which fail  to meet one only of 
the five  criteria. This approach could be 
justified on the grounds that the admis-
sion criteria are biased towards mone-
tary and fiscal policy measures. But 
most of the selection criteria mooted in 
economic publications relate to real 
economic variables. And even the EC 
Treaty calls for the application of other 
criteria, although the wording is vague. 
Article 109(j)(l) also refers to "the 
results of the integration of  markets", 
"the situation and development of the 
balances of  payments on current 
account", "the development of unit 
labour costs" and "other price indices" 
as factors to be taken into account. 
2.1 0.  The advantages of a further 
examination are neatly illustrated by the case of Belgium. On the basis of  the 
definition set out in the Treaty, Bel-
gium's ratio of  government debt to 
GDP currently stands at 133.5o/o. Even 
the most strenuous efforts would be 
insufficient to bring this ratio close to 
the Treaty's 60o/o  benchmark by 1997, 
the year of the convergence examina-
tion. Even under the EC Treaty's more 
flexible requirements that, in order to 
qualifY,  a Member State's deficit ratio 
should be "sufficiently diminishing and 
approaching the reference value at a sat-
isfactory pace" (Article 1  04  (c) (2)), Bel-
gium could clearly hardly qualifY for 
participation in monetary union from 
the point of  view of the debt criteria. 
2.1 0.1.  And yet Belgium is a country 
which enjoys a high degree of  economic 
stability, as illustrated by the fact that it 
fulfils the price, interest-rate and 
exchange-rate criteria set out in the 
Treaty.  Belgium would also qualifY for 
monetary union on the basis of  a num-
ber of real economic measures. These 
include continuing large balance of pay-
ments surpluses despite a real revaluation 
of  the Belgian franc, the degree of  open-
ness of the Belgian economy and the fact 
that Belgium is a relatively small econo-
my. And finally,  Belgium's structure of 
production - a highly developed services' 
sector, a strong industrial sector and a 
small agricultural sector - are comparable 
with those of  many other European 
countries. This means that terms of trade 
shocks would have a symmetrical effect 
and that the exchange-rate adjustment 
instrument would not be needed. 
2.11.  An examination focusing exclu-
sively on the convergence criteria will 
thus not necessarily lead to the selection 
of the countries most suitable for par-
ticipation in monetary union. 
3.  Establishment of the conver-
sion rates to be applied on entry to 
the third stage of monetary union 
3.1.  The ESC's discussions on the 
introduction of the single currency have 
always been coloured by the concern 
that the conversion rates to be set for 
entry to monetary union could be dis-
torted by speculation on the interna-
tional financial and currency markets. 
The danger of speculative attacks will 
be particularly acute during the period 
when the members of  the new currency 
union have already been decided by the 
Council but the currencies of the par-
ticipating countries have not yet been 
irrevocably linked. The EC Treaty con-
tains no clear provisions on the conver-
sion rates at which entry to the single 
currency will occur. Article 109(1)(4) 
does stipulate that the transition to the 
third stage shall not modifY the external 
value of the ecu. Strictly interpreted, 
however, this would mean that currency 
union would have to take place at the 
market rates valid on the day before 
conversion. The ESC cannot endorse 
this approach. 
3.2.  In order to prevent cost-induced 
distortions of competition in interna-
tional trade, the ESC considers it essen-
tial to ensure that speculative upheavals 
do not lead to fundamentally unjusti-
fied conversion rates being applied at 
the beginning of monetary union. This 
is all  the more important in the light of 
the experience garnered from the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS, 
that exchange rates justified in real eco-
nomic terms are an essential precondi-
tion for the success of a currency sys-
tem. If a country participates in a cur-
rency system at an exchange rate which 
is too high it runs the risk of  losing 
price competitiveness. This would be all 30 
the more problematic on entry to the 
third stage of monetary union as, with 
the disappearance of national curren-
cies, such overvaluation could no 
longer be compensated for by a relative-
ly low level of interest rates. The dis-
torting effects on external trade flows 
would be permanent and could only be 
corrected by productivity gains in the 
countries with overvalued currencies. 
But as such gains are in the short term 
nearly always achieved via job losses, 
the catching-up process would be par-
ticularly painful and would lead to a 
further rise in unemployment in the 
countries concerned. This would also 
have a detrimental effect on public 
acceptance of the common currency. 
3.3.  One way of eliminating this 
problem would be to declare average 
rates established over at least two years 
to be the conversion rates. The 
exchange rate must not diverge signifi-
cantly from the average value over this 
period, however. The advantage of this 
approach over the central rates proce-
dure is that the market plays the deci-
sive part in determining fundamentally 
"correct" exchange rates. 
3.4.  Another approach would be to 
use a weighting system which would 
assign a steadily decreasing weighting to 
market rates as  the irrevocable fixing of 
exchange rates approached. In order to 
deprive market operators of targets for 
speculation it would be a good idea not 
to publish the weighting system used. 
In this way currency speculations tak-
ing place shortly before monetary 
union in particular would not affect the 
conversion rates. 
3.5.  The models presented here are 
only some of  the possible solutions. 
The ESC does not consider it particu-
larly important which of them is cho-
sen. What is  important is  that the 
responsible European institutions 
should be aware of the problem and 
should plan in advance their response 
in the event of major disturbances on 
the currency markets. No satisfactory 
proposals have so far been officially 
made in this regard. In its study of the 
transition to the single currency pub-
lished in November 1995, the Euro-
pean Monetary Institute makes no 
mention of the problem. The view 
expressed by the Commission in its 
above-mentioned Green Paper, that 
strict application of the convergence 
criteria will be sufficient to prevent dis-
turbances on the financial and currency 
markets, is essentially correct. But even 
then, speculation cannot be entirely 
excluded. The experience of the EMS 
has shown this. Again and again funda-
mentally "healthy" currencies were 
dragged down in the wake of other cur-
rencies. It is also conceivable that cur-
rency turmoil might originate outside 
the EU. Many European currencies 
come under pressure whenever the US 
dollar is weak. The most recent exam-
ple of this occurred at the turn of 
1994/199  5, when European currencies 
came under devaluation pressure as a 
result of the peso crisis. The ESC feels 
that the Community must be prepared 
for exogenous shocks of this kind 
which might coincide with entry to the 
third stage of monetary union. 
4.  Starting date for monetary 
unton 
4.1.  The starting date for the third 
phase of monetary union is now virtu-
ally certain to be  1 January 1999, as 
provided for by Article 1  09j (4)  of the 
EC Treaty. The Council must decide 
"which Member States fulfil the neces-sary conditions for the adoption of  a 
single currency" by the deadline of 30 
June 1998. According to the letter of 
the Treaty, the single currency should 
be introduced even if,  in the extreme 
case, only one country satisfies the stat-
ed conditions. The spirit of the provi-
sions is obviously quite different. 
4.2.  Clearly- as has been repeatedly 
stated - the Treaty is intended to estab-
lish a "stable currency", which repre-
sents the aggregate of  a number of 
equally stable currencies. The long-term 
stability of the single currency depends 
on the prospects for sustainable devel-
opment in those economies, a factor 
too frequently accorded secondary 
importance, if not ignored. 
4.3.  As indicated in Section 2, the 
admission criteria provided for by the 
Treaty are, in many respects, so elastic 
as  to allow scope for that degree of 
pragmatism which, bearing in mind all 
relevant factors, might prove necessary 
when they are applied. Such pragma-
tism must not, however, be interpreted 
either as laxity or a departure from the 
established criteria. The goal of  creating 
a strong, stable currency must be given 
priority in all decision-making. 
4.4.  GDP growth, which has 
remained below forecasts in some coun-
tries, the problem of managing public 
finances and employment trends, which 
are critical almost everywhere, are all 
now giving rise to concern for the 
future. This has helped to create doubt 
in political and economic circles, which 
is  perhaps even greater among the gen-
eral public, as  to whether a significant 
group of countries can qualify for 
admission to monetary union by 
30 June 1998. 
4.5.  The Treaty defines the date and 
procedure to be adopted for the start of 
monetary union. This fact should auto-
matically dispel any doubts and prompt 
the Member States to take all necessary 
steps to meet the specified conditions in 
the short time remaining before the 
decision date. 
4.6.  Efforts aimed solely at ensuring 
entry to monetary union will not be 
sufficient. The preconditions for the 
sustainable, long-term growth referred 
to in Point 4.2. must also be created. It 
is  becoming imperative to adopt grad-
ual growth policies, whilst avoiding 
temporary emergency measures and, in 
particular, social disruption. This 
approach may be time-consuming and 
the deadline may be missed. It would, 
however, be in the interests of any 
potential adherent, as well as of mone-
tary union as  a whole, to opt for 
delayed admission from a firm founda-
tion rather than for hasty admission 
with no prospect of stability. 
4.7.  Nevertheless, the basic question 
remains: is  there still sufficient time to 
enable a significant number of coun-
tries to participate in monetary union? 
Moreover, what would constitute a "sig-
nificant number"? The ESC believes 
that the actual total is  not, in itself, rel-
evant; it is  more important for the sin-
gle currency to be created by countries 
which together account for at least 50o/o 
ofEU GDP. 
4.7.1. In this connection, the following 
table shows individual national GDP 
rates and assumes a monetary union 
which initially includes Germany, Aus-
tria, the Benelux countries, France, Ire-
land and Finland. It is further assumed 
that the UK and Denmark will use the 
opt-out clause and that Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, Portugal and Greece are not in 
a position to accede. It is obvious that 
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neither the 50°/o  threshold nor mone-
tary union could be achieved without 
Germany and France - a fact which 
now seems to be politically accepted. 
5.  The position of the future 
European Central Bank and the 
interrelationship between national 
fiscal and European monetary poli-
cy 
5 .1.  The EC Treaty defines the legal 
status of the ECB and its main respon-
sibility in Articles  105 (objectives and 
tasks of the ESCB) and 107 (ECB's 
independence of instructions). The first 
sentence of  Article 105(1) in particular 
states that "The primary objective of 
the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability''. For the Member States, the 
experience of recent decades justified 
giving priority to the securing of mone-
tary stability. Thus, countries with a low 
inflation rate would have relatively low 
real interest rates and hence a more 
robust record of investment and job-
creation. Economic theory also predicts 
this, as  the efficient allocation of 
resources via relative price changes is 
possible only if there is  monetary stabil-
ity.  In times of high inflation the price 
structure is distorted and prices can no 
longer perform their guiding function, 
with its positive impact on prosperity. It 
is  not only the goods market which is 
affected by loss of information as a 
result of inflation. The positive correla-
tion of price and interest-rate levels, and 
of price and wage levels, also has a neg-
ative impact on factor markets. The 
result is a misallocation of resources on 
virtually all  markets, and ultimately for-
gone growth: on the goods market, 
because producers cannot gear supply to 
demand; on the capital market, because 
savings are no longer lent to investors 
whose projects promise the highest 
returns; on the labour market, because 
wage earners can no longer identify the 
activity with the strongest demand for 
labour. 
5 .1.1. The primacy of securing mone-
tary stability does not, however, mean 
that the ECB is absolved of responsibili-
ty for economic policy. The second sen-
tence of  Article 105(1) clearly points to 
the ECB's responsibility, as  "without 
prejudice to the objective of price sta-
bility, the ESCB shall support the gen-
eral economic policies in the Commu-
nity with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the 
Community as  laid down in Article 2", 
for example a high level of employ-
ment. 
5.1.2. In view of the requirements aris-
ing from this legal framework- primacy 
of monetary stability, support of eco-
nomic policy objectives without preju-
dice to price stability - the ESC calls for 
improvements to facilitate the ECB's 
performance of its primary task. The 
planned shape of monetary union is not 
likely,  the ESC feels,  to guarantee non-
inflationary provision of money, despite 
the existence of an issuing bank with 
the best possible institutional safe-
guards. 
5.1.3. Probably the greatest threat to 
the maintenance of monetary stability is 
posed by fiscal policy. One of the 
remaining unsolved conceptual prob-
lems in the way of monetary union is 
the different situation with regard to 
powers in respect of fiscal  and monetary 
policy. Whilst the ESCB is  the instru-
ment for the implementation of a 
supranational monetary policy has been 
created in the shape of the ESCB, fiscal 
policy will remain in the hands of E 
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national governments, which in the 
light of the subsidiarity principle is  to 
be welcomed. The room for manoeuvre 
in respect of the allocation of  fiscal 
powers should be used in a decentral-
ized way in order to bring decision-
making closer to the citizen. 
5.1.4. This separation carries with it, 
however, the danger of monetary policy 
endeavours aimed at stability being viti-
ated by destabilizing fiscal policies in 
the Member States. In this context the 
sanction mechanisms provided for in 
Article 1  04c of the EC Treaty (monitor-
ing of the budgetary situation in the 
Member States) have been repeatedly 
criticized as  too weak. First and fore-
most, sanctions can be imposed only by 
a two-thirds majority in the Council. If 
a (qualified) majority of Member States 
is experiencing structural budget prob-
lems therefore, far-reaching decisions 
are unlikely. It would therefore be advis-
able to make the sanctions' mechanisms 
automatic, thus avoiding the need for 
long drawn-out votes in the Council of 
Ministers. Moreover, the timescale for 
the implementation of  sanctions is  too 
long. If the procedures laid down in 
Article 1  04c are strictly adhered, to ten 
years could easily pass before effective 
measures are taken. 
5.1.5. The ESC welcomes a number of 
proposals aimed at increasing fiscal dis-
cipline in the Member States. It sees a 
need for an additional agreement limit-
ing new annual indebtedness to an eco-
nomically acceptable level and provid-
ing for appropriate sanctions in the 
event of infringement of the stability 
criteria. The ESC looks with favour on 
the proposal that interest-free deposits 
with the ECB be required, in the event 
of an excessive budget deficit, to be 
refunded only when the budget situa-
tion had been rectified. So as not to 
impose an additional burden on coun-
tries facing fiscal problems, the amounts 
deposited should not be taken into 
account in calculating the budget 
deficit. The ESC feels,  however, that 
such a stability pact should also provide 
scope for stabilization of demand in 
times of recession.  But this should be 
expressly limited to the duration of the 
cyclical downswing. 
5.1.6. A voluntary additional agreement 
between the participating countries 
committing them to sound budgetary 
policies would have major advantages. 
First, it would increase citizens' confi-
dence in the monetary union as, with 
much stronger stability requirements, 
the common currency would run less 
risk of  weakness. And secondly, volun-
tary fiscal policy restraint would allay 
citizens' fears of the state sector taking 
an ever greater slice of their incomes. A 
stability pact would also strengthen the 
political union as,  in addition to mone-
tary policy, a degree of national respon-
sibility for fiscal policy would indirectly 
be transferred to Community level 
without any increase in the European 
central budget. 
5.1.7. The ESC calls on the responsible 
European institutions to take measures 
to further convergence in economic 
policy. The reduction of debt-financed 
state demand will have disinflationary 
effects. Another welcome effect of a sta-
bility pact would be to reduce govern-
ment recourse to the capital market. 
This would result in falling real interest 
rates and, hence, a better climate for 
private investment, private consump-
tion and, ultimately, employment. 
5.2.  Nevertheless, the ECB's task of 
maintaining price stability is not inde-
pendent of the other factors contribut-ing to economic convergence, which is 
the responsibility of the Member States. 
It is for them to control public expendi-
ture, not only with regard to invest-
ment but also in respect of social provi-
sions, public health and pensions. 
Reducing unemployment should be one 
of their main objectives alongside the 
goal of maintaining competitiveness. 
Inflation should be contained and, 
when necessary, reduced. A fiscal  policy 
in tune with sustainable growth repre-
sents the cornerstone of the entire sys-
tem. 
5.2.1. The foregoing gives  rise  to the 
following observation: an independent 
ECB policy on currency management 
and the maintenance of price stability 
would have to be backed up by national 
economic and social policies. These 
policies are, however, the responsibility 
of  authorities facing different national 
situations which can involve a mix of 
measures that are not necessarily com-
patible with the goal of convergence. 
5.3.  Thus, compliance with the con-
vergence criteria- which are sound eco-
nomic policy principles, quite apart 
from being requirements of the Treaty -
becomes of  vital importance for the 
individual Member States and the 
Community as a whole. If this principle 
is accepted, purely "national" policies 
are clearly no longer acceptable. Eco-
nomic policies must be based on com-
mon guidelines aimed at creating the 
conditions for admission to the single 
currency. 
5.4.  Under the Treaty, the European 
Central Bank is  required to pursue the 
objective of monetary stability. It is  not 
clear, however, what will be regarded as 
the highest acceptable inflation rate for 
the EU. And thus fiscal, wages and 
monetary policy lack a concrete bench-
mark, making it difficult for economic 
operators to know what to expect. 
5.4.1. It would seem appropriate to for-
mulate a medium-term inflation target 
binding for a period of  several years. An 
argument against such an annual target 
is that exogenous shocks - such as a rise 
in the price of crude oil - could tem-
porarily lead to a higher rate of infla-
tion. If the future ECB were committed 
to an annual target, the result might be 
excessive swings in monetary policy 
leading to severe dislocations on the 
factor and goods' markets. 
5.4.2. Over the last few years a number 
of countries have set specific inflation 
targets. The experience gained by these 
countries has been positive. Significant 
progress has generally been made on 
reducing inflation. The ESC feels  that 
2°/o would be a suitable medium-term 
target at European level. This would be 
in line with the policy pursued by a 
number of central banks and thus 
would signal stability to the markets. 
5.5.  The EC Treaty neither spells out 
an inflation target nor specifies the 
monetary strategy to be pursued in 
order to underpin the value of money. 
One of the EMI's main tasks during the 
second stage of EMU is  to draw up a 
monetary policy plan. This is  to be 
ready by the end of 1996. The ESC 
therefore wishes to express its views on 
the subject now. 
5.5.1. There are two possible strategies 
for safeguarding the value of  money: 
either direct use of monetary policy to 
control inflation or adoption of a inter-
mediate target such as control of the 
money supply. Experience has been 
acquired in respect of both these meth-
ods. The Bank of England, for example, 
uses control of inflation and the Bun-
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desbank uses control of the money sup-
ply.  Each of these approaches has specif-
ic advantages and disadvantages. 
5.5.2. Controlling inflation directly 
involves underpinning the value of the 
currency by influencing market interest 
rates. The main problem with this 
approach is the lack of certainty as  to 
the optimum amount and duration of 
an interest-rate change. Thus, there is a 
danger that "the wrong interest rates" 
and variable time lags will actually 
accentuate the current cycle. There is 
also a structural hiatus in the causal 
relationship between interest rates and 
the inflation rate. Whilst, in the short 
term, these two variables are inversely 
correlated, in the longer term there is a 
positive correlation. 
5.5.3. The biggest problem in using an 
intermediate monetary target is that a 
clear positive relationship between the 
money supply and inflation exists only 
as  long as  monetary demand remains 
stable. Recent studies in the United 
States have shown that, as a result of 
large-scale financial market innovations, 
this condition is  no longer fulfilled. 
Numerous studies of the German mar-
ket, on the other hand, have shown that 
even after unification monetary demand 
remains stable. 
5.5.4. For the purposes of European-
level decisions, it is  important to estab-
lish whether aggregate monetary 
demand is sufficient to determine sta-
bility. Numerous studies have been car-
ried out on this question. The results so 
far suggest that monetary demand is 
more stable in a common monetary 
gives the financial markets a central 
guidance value for expectations. If a 
whole series of often contradictory indi-
cators (growth, business expectations, 
money supply trends, interest-rate 
structural trends, etc.) of future infla-
tionary dangers are taken into account 
in deciding interest policy ("looking at 
everything"), the basic criteria under-
pinning monetary policy are no longer 
perfectly obvious to the market. The 
resultant uncertainty produces compar-
atively greater volatility in the financial 
markets with an uncertain investment 
climate. Lastly, the use of an intermedi-
ate monetary target has the advantage 
of dispelling the impression that mone-
tary policy is aimed exclusively at price 
stability. Reference should be made in 
this context to the requirement, con-
tained in the second sentence of  Article 
105(1), that the ECB support the gen-
eral economic policies in the Commu-
nity. 
5.5.5. The ESC is,  of course, aware that 
the use of an intermediate monetary 
target can also cause problems. In the 
context of ongoing financial market 
innovation and ever-increasing capital 
market movements, failure to meet the 
money supply target cannot be ruled 
out. This could pose serious problems 
for the European Central Bank. If, in 
the interests of its reputation, it was 
unduly strict in the pursuit of the 
money supply objective, it could jeopar-
dize growth. On the other hand, the 
market could interpret a failure to act as 
area than in national monetary areasr,. 
Thus, an intermediate monetary target 
could also be fixed in the new monetary  6 
union. The main advantage of this 
approach is  that an intermediate target 
SeeM. Falk and N. Funke loc. sit. and 0. and 
].].M. Kremers and P.O.  Lane, Economic and 
Monetary Integration and the Demand for Money 
in the EMS, in:  IMF Staff Papers 37, pp. 777-805. a threat to stability. To avoid such prob-
lems, it is crucial for overall EU mone-
tary demand to be more stable than 
that .of individual Community regions -
possibly through a comparatively low 
level of currency substitution. Use of an 
intermediate monetary target seems 
advisable if this condition is satisfied. 
The ESC therefore calls on the EMI to 
intensify its studies of the stability of 
monetary demand in the future curren-
cy area. The results of these studies 
could provide a basis for the EMI mon-
etary policy plan. 
5.6.  Maintaining the principle of 
neutrality with respect to competition 
must be the prime consideration when 
effecting currency conversion. This 
applies to the design of the monetary-
policy instruments as well as  to the for-
mulation of  objectives and strategy. In 
order to supply the banking system 
with central bank funds, all commercial 
b~nks, regardless of  size, must be given 
duect access to ECB funds. Restricting 
the future ECB to open market transac-
tions will place smaller financial institu-
tions at a disadvantage. One of the 
problems is  that smaller institutions 
which do not trade actively on the 
~oney  markets have difficulty dispos-
mg of the surplus funds arising from an 
over-generous tender allocation. This 
problem does not arise in the case of 
refinancing via standing facilities. 
Under this system, the financial institu-
tion decides whether and when it wish-
es to cover its needs with central bank 
funds. If  close control of the money 
~upply.  is  sought~ central bank financing 
Is  mevitably subJeCt to quotas; in the 
interests of a competition-neutral refi-
nancing policy, it should therefore be 
e!ls~red that the refinancing rate is not 
sigmficantly below the market interest 
rate. 
6.  Derogation Member States: 
economic considerations and.  .. mon-
etary cooperation 
6.1.  Adoption of  the single currency 
will lead to the creation of two groups of 
countries within the EU, namely those in 
a position to join EMU and the remain-
ing countries. There is still some uncer-
tainty as to the identity of the "deroga-
tion" countries, and it is not known 
whether the two Member States (Den-
mark and UK) which have secured the 
"opt-out" clause intend to apply it. It is, 
however, interesting to examine the posi-
tion of  the two different groups of  coun-
tries and the relations between them. 
6.2.  The advantages of the single cur-
rency for participating countries have 
been amply described in reports and 
Opinions of the Commission, Council, 
Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee itself, as well as in 
countless statements, speeches and writ-
ings. With the exception of the oppo-
nents of  the single currency, there is 
?ow general agreement on the follow-
mg aspects: 
•  greater average price stability 
throughout the EU; 
• 
• 
• 
general reduction in the cost of 
transactions and rate fixing; 
greater price transparency between 
countries; 
lower administrative and cash man-
agement costs for firms (excluding 
start-up costs); 
•  stimulus to growth, competitiveness 
and employment; 
•  possibility for the euro to become a 
reserve currency. 
6.2.1. The derogation countries will 
not enjoy these benefits of the single currency, finding themselves in a less 
favourable position with a real risk of 
the creation of a "two-speed" Europe. 
Non-participation in EMU must there-
fore represent a "transitional stage" as 
defined by the Commission
7
• The 
shorter this phase is,  the less serious 
will be its impact. The ESC cannot fail 
to endorse this position. The need for 
derogation states to participate in EMU 
without delay will provide a stimulus 
for their economic re-organization. At 
the same time, the ESC would warn 
against facile optimism and over-sim-
plification; the situation in several 
countries shows no signs of  dramatic 
improvement in the short term and 
economic re-organization is an objec-
tive necessity, regardless of the need for 
EMU membership. 
6.3.  The single market has progressed 
and the EU institutions have done 
what they could to promote growth. At 
the same time, unemployment and the 
need to improve competitiveness con-
tinue to be outstanding problems. Nei-
ther the current economic situation in 
Europe nor future forecasts offer . 
encouragement for Structural Fund 
increases and the general continuation 
of  assistance policies. All these factors 
suggest that the much-vaunted "solidar-
ity" cannot be embodied in a policy of 
further subsidies; individual countries 
must impose a more rigorous discipline 
and exhibit greater self-reliance than in 
the past. 
6.4.  Enlargement of the European 
Union to cover countries which have 
applied, or will apply, for membership -
though several will presumably not be 
ready for EMU entry immediately -
will constitute a new, serious problem. 
Together with the new derogation 
states, derogation countries which have 
still not joined EMU at the time of 
enlargement would help to create a sig-
nificant nucleus of non-participants. It 
would no longer be a question of a 
two-speed Europe but of two separate 
groups, with a different understanding 
of the term "Europe". The political 
danger would then overshadow the 
already serious economic risks. 
6.5.  In addition to the disadvantages, 
certain advantages for the derogation 
countries must be taken into account. 
They would be able to benefit from the 
experience of the core group. Even 
given the most thorough preparation, 
the introduction of the new currency 
and the adoption of a single monetary 
policy by the ECB will not be free of 
teething problems. It may even prove 
advantageous to have more time to ful-
fil  the convergence criteria. Abruptly 
coming into line with the Maastricht 
objectives without concern for a coun-
try's structural peculiarities could result 
in loss of demand with damaging con-
sequences for the labour market
8
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structural budget deficits were gradually 
reduced, however, such effects would be 
far less likely.  Gradual reduction of 
structural deficits and a corresponding 
reduction in the government debt ratio 
should be reflected in a reduction in 
7  "Exchange links between the Member States tak-
ing part in the third phase of EMU and the other 
Member States"; Interim report to the European 
Council, 28 November 1995. 
8  Thus a study carried out by the National Institute 
for Economic and Social Research showed that 
reducing all the EU Member States' budget deficits 
to the 3% level required by the Maastricht Treaty by 
1999 would lead to the temporary loss of  some half 
a million jobs. Fulfillment of the debt criterion by 
2002 could lead to the temporary loss of  a further 
million jobs. Greece would be the hardest hit, with 
450,000 lost jobs. SeeR. Barell, J. Morgan and N. 
Pain: The Employment Effects of  the Maastricht 
Fiscal Criteria, National Institute for Economic and 
Social Research Discussion Paper 81. the risk premium component of interest 
rates. Yields would also benefit from 
relatively lower expectations of  infla-
tion. The resulting impetus to growth 
ought, in the medium term, consider-
ably to outweigh the loss of demand 
resulting from consolidation. Finally, 
the derogation countries would have 
access to the instrument of exchange-
rate adaptation, which could prove 
advantageous in the light of different 
productivity trends. 
6.6.  In view of the special situation of 
the derogation countries it will be nec-
essary to make arrangements for mone-
tary relations between both groups of 
Member States. Any possible agreement 
should be based on three key require-
ments: ensuring that the internal mar-
ket continues to operate smoothly; 
guaranteeing the greatest possible level 
of currency stability; and facilitating the 
transition of the non-participating 
countries to the single currency in the 
medium term. 
6. 7.  The ESC advocates an exchange-
rate system based on the EMS linking 
the currencies of the derogation coun-
tries to the common currency. With 
this aim in view,  the derogation coun-
tries will, however, have to pursue a rig-
orous anti-inflationary policy and a dis-
ciplined fiscal policy. Only on this basis 
should the future ECB intervene in the 
market in conjunction with the central 
banks of the derogation countries to 
provide necessary exchange-rate sup-
port. With increasing success in attain-
ing convergence, the currencies of the 
derogation countries should be allowed 
to operate in progressively narrower 
fluctuation margins around the central 
Community rate. To qualify for subse-
quent entry to monetary union, the 
derogation countries would have every 
interest to satisfy the exchange-rate cri-
terion in the manner outlined in Point 
2.6.1. The advantage of a flexible 
approach of this kind, the ESC feels,  is 
that narrowing of the fluctuation mar-
gins would test in the market the suit-
ability of  a currency for entry to the 
monetary union. 
6.8.  This approach would not be 
without dangers for the common cur-
rency. As explained in Point 4.4., a 
strong common currency could make 
intervention on the foreign exchanges 
necessary to support weak currencies. 
The resulting monetary expansion in 
the monetary union would pose an 
inflationary threat. Therefore any agree-
ment between the monetary union and 
the derogation countries must include 
the instrument of  devaluation of the 
central exchange-rate. 
7.  Organization of the social 
dialogue and consequences for the 
labour market in a European mone-
tary area 
7.1.  Underlying the planned Euro-
pean Monetary Union is the conviction 
that it would strengthen the European 
internal market. This is of particular 
importance in view of the EU's relative-
ly weak growth and employment trends 
of the last few years.  Rising structural 
unemployment is one of  Europe's most 
pressing social problems. Since 1980 
employment trends in the EU have 
been distinctly less favourable than in 
comparable industrialized countries. 
The average rise in employment in 
Europe between 1980 and 1994, was 
some 1.25 percentage points lower than 
the corresponding figure for the US 
and approximately 0.85 lower than the 
figure for Japan and the gap continues to widen. Moreover, the figure for 
Japan is  considerably depressed by the 
structural crisis which has persisted 
since 1990. The EU 1994 unemploy-
ment rate of 11.5°/o was 5.4 percentage 
points higher than that of the USA and 
8.4 percentage points higher than that 
of  Japan. And the prospects for the 
labour market are not likely to improve 
rapidly. According to an OECD labour 
market study
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in both production-related services and 
high-technology products (computers, 
space technology, genetic engineering 
etc.) was below that of the USA and 
Japan. In view of these trends, the 
attention of all political and social lead-
ers must be focused on the realization 
of the anticipated employment gains 
from monetary union. 
7.2.  The EC White Paper and the 
OECD labour-market study referred to 
above pinpointed the rising pressure of 
taxes and levies on wages and declining 
investment and innovation as  the main 
causes of  rising unemployment. 
Although the widely postulated nega-
tive correlation between wage costs and 
employment trends is not empirically 
proven, it is  undeniable at a time of 
growing mobility of  capital that labour 
costs - particularly when amplified by 
fun  dam  en  tally unjustified exchange-rate 
movements- are becoming a steadily 
more important determinant in inter-
national competition. On the other 
hand, in the medium to long term ade-
quate employment growth can clearly 
be guaranteed only if there is a high 
level of innovation and investment. 
Unfortunately, industry's gross invest-
ment in fixed assets is growing more 
slowly in the EU than in comparable 
world-market competitor countries. 
Whilst the average rate of  growth for 
the period 1980 to 1994 was 3.3o/o for 
the USA and 5.6o/o for Japan, for the 
EU it amounted to a meagre 2.0o/o. 
Europe is  thus running the risk of 
being decoupled in the future from 
worldwide growth trends. 
7.2.1. The current problems of  weak 
level of growth and rising unemploy-
ment will, in the ESC's view, not be 
solved by postponing the beginning of 
Monetary Union; what is  needed is to 
implement a policy which reconciles 
fiscal discipline, economic growth and 
employment policy objectives, on the 
basis of the proposals set out in the 
White Paper on Growth, Competitive-
ness and Employment - The Challenges 
and Ways Forward into the 21 '' Centu-
ry.  EMU must not be implemented 
solely as  a project for achieving stability, 
in isolation from the overall economic 
context.  It is just as  necessary to create 
jobs which have a promising future and 
to combat unemployment as it is  to 
create a zone of  stability. 
7.3.  In view of the serious labour-
market problems in the EU, the ESC 
would refer once again to the guidelines 
for structural reform of the labour mar-
kets adopted by the Essen European 
Council in 1994. These were: 
•  improving employment opportuni-
ties for the labour force by promot-
~ng investment in vocational train-
mg; 
•  raising the employment-intensive-
ness of  growth; 
•  reducing non-wage labour costs; 
9  See OECD: The OECD Jobs Study. Facts, Analy-
sis, Strategies, Paris  1994, pp.  19 et seq. •  improving the effectiveness of  labour 
market policy; 
•  improving measures to help groups 
which are particularly hard hit by 
unemployment. 
7.3.1. The final communique of  the 
Essen Summit called on the Member 
States to submit programmes for the 
implementation of these measures. The 
ESC regrets that, so far,  few Member 
States have complied with this call. The 
ESC believes that the EU should moni-
tor the implementation of employment-
promotion measures. As in the area of 
fiscal policy, the ESC considers that a 
case may be made for an additional 
agreement requiring the Member States 
to pay an employment levy in the event 
of non-compliance with jointly adopted 
labour-market initiatives. 
7.4.  The solutions set out in Point 
7.3. above do not exhaust the range of 
possible EU employment-initiative 
measures. For example, the ESC won-
ders whether structural changes to the 
taxation system could serve the objec-
tive of  full employment. 
7.5.  The beginning of monetary 
union in Europe will also  bring changes 
in the field of wages policy. The ESC 
points out that the free collective bar-
gaining between employers and workers 
successfully practised in many EU 
Member States must retain its place in 
European economic life. The increasing 
integration of  labour markets which 
will accompany monetary union will 
also require that transnational merger 
rights be guaranteed. 
7.6.  For the countries participating in 
monetary union, the introduction of 
the single currency will mean the end 
of the exchange rate as a mechanism for 
responding to structural problems and 
exogenous shocks. If a currency cannot 
be devalued, the main burden of struc-
tural adjustment will fall  on wages and 
prices. Finland provides the most recent 
European example of this. Its exports 
fell  by approximately 20o/o  after the 
opening-up of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union's entry into the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Without the subsequent dramatic 
devaluation of the markka, the Finnish 
export industry would scarcely have 
been able to cope with the new condi-
tions. 
7.6.1. External disturbances will have 
serious consequences for growth and 
employment as a result of the loss of 
international price competitiveness. 
Greater mobility of labour is also neces-
sary in and between individual Member 
States. To promote this movement, the 
ESC calls for financial support for mea-
sures to facilitate the taking-up of 
employment in another Member State, 
for example funding for language cours-
es.  It should also be noted that supple-
mentary company pensiOn msurance 
has consistently proved an obstacle to 
mobility in the past. The ESC therefore 
sees a need for at least partial EU har-
monization of  such pension arrange-
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ments. Migratory movements must not, 
of course, lead to structural discontinu-
ities in labour markets. 
7.7.  The dawn of a new age in 
Europe provides an opportunity to reor-
ganize the economic policy decision-
making process. The ESC wishes in 
particular to be involved more directly 
in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
adopted annually by the Ecofin Coun-
cil. This would be advisable with a view 
to the establishment of a future regula-
tory framework for European wages 
policy. The ESC is convinced that the 
special interests represented within it 
will enable it to make a useful contribu-
tion to regulatory questions in a Euro-
pean monetary union. In this context 
the ESC would reiterate its calls made 
in the report of 26 April 1995 on The 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
and the Role of the Economic and 
Social Committee. 
8.  Communication measures 
8.1.  The only way to dispel any fears 
over the practical aspects of implemen-
tation of the single currency is  to orga-
nize a flawless communication plan, 
based on past experience. At the 
moment only some Member States 
seem to have provided for a communi-
cations budget in the run-up to the 
introduction of the euro. The key words 
here are integrity, clarity, transparency, 
psychology, education. 
8.1.1. From 1 January 2002 euro notes 
and coins will be in circulation along-
side existing notes and coins. The tran-
sition period will last for no longer than 
6 months. For a smooth changeover it 
is vital that European citizens be prop-
erly informed prior to the event. 
8.2 ..  Lessons must be drawn from past 
expenence. 
8.2.1. French experience with the 
changeover from the old "germinal" 
franc to the new "pinay" franc offers 
many lessons. On 1 January 1960, the 
old French franc was converted into the 
new franc with 100 old francs making 
up the new franc.  35 years on, many 
French people - including the media -
still calculate in the old currency. Dur-
ing 1959, no specific communication 
measures were taken to prepare for the 
changeover. At the time of the 
changeover in 1960, shopkeepers were 
told to ensure that any price display in 
new francs was also accompanied by the 
corresponding amount in the old cur-
rency. The year 1961 saw the introduc-
·tion of the obligation to add "NF" 
(Nouveaux Francs, or "new francs")  to 
the price, but there was no longer any 
obligation to display the corresponding 
amount in old francs. 
8.2.1.1.  The public had dearly not 
been sufficiently prepared; in fact, no 
real information campaign seems to 
have been envisaged to prepare them for 
the changeover. Up until January 1960, 
very little information seems to have 
been available to explain the changeover 
and its consequences to consumers. 
This was, of course, prior to the media 
boom, and bankers, public authorities 
and teachers were under no obligation 
to provide people with a clear message 
in the run-up to the changeover from 
old francs to new francs. With hind-
sight, it seems that the few steps taken 
to familiarize people with the 
changeover only served to encourage 
mental complacency rather than pro-
vide practical information. Moreover, 
the simplicity of the conversion from 
old francs to new francs also encour-aged complacency. When the consumer 
is faced with a complex conversion rate, 
he soon works out his own value-scale 
by fixing some reference points in the 
new currency. On the other hand, when 
the exchange rate is simple (knock off 
two zeros), the consumer does not take 
the trouble to get used to the new 
value, especially for large sums of 
money which he may not be used to 
handling. 
8.2.1.2.  Since the conversion was sim-
ple, the French government of the day 
n_o  doubt :hought it superfluous to pro-
vide extra mformation measures after 
the chan&eove~.  _It would now appear 
that the simplicity of the conversion 
rate should have made back-up mea-
sures all the more necessary. 
*  Visual information 
Advertising hoardings, shop-window 
displays, newspapers and leaflets could 
have provided efficient back-up. 
*  Radio information 
In 1960, few homes had TV, so 
radio ~ould have  ~een the best way 
to provide further mformation on 
the changeover. 
*  Information in schools 
Teachers should have made children 
and young people aware of the situ-
ation. They would have been able to 
bring the message home to the fami-
ly:  in those days, the family was 
often more closely-knit. 
*  Information via business circles 
Employers, banks, public adminis-
trations, etc. <;:auld have been 
encouraged more to help spread the 
message. 
8.2.2. The British and Irish experience 
in the changeover to decimal currency 
was quite different. 
8.2.2.1.  In 1971, it took the United 
Kingdom five  days to switch to the dec-
imal currency. The two currencies were 
legal tender simultaneously for five  days 
only. The success of the operation was 
the fruit of considerable input i11  infor-
mation, training and education over a 
four-year period. 
8.2.2.2  ..  Ireland, which changed over 
to a deCimal currency at the same time 
as the UK, provides an example of a 
suc~essful_coT?munication campaign. 
An mtensive mformation campaign was 
conducted to ensure that the public 
were perfectly prepared for the 
changeover. 
8.2:2.3.  In January 1971, a guide to 
deCimal currency was distributed free of 
charge to every household in the coun-
try. It provided brief, basic information 
for everyday shopping in decimal cur-
rency. It dealt with the new coins· writ-
ing and pronouncing figures in d~cimal 
currency; cheques; banknotes; and dual 
price display. It included a copy of the 
price conversion tables for the most 
c_o~mon  pu~chases. A large-scale adver-
nst~g campatgn used the press, TV and 
radiO,  buses, and billboards in streets 
throughout the country. The campaign 
had two main aims: to point out the 
need to read "Everyone's guide to deci-
mal currency", and to provide people 
with very simple information to prepare 
them for the changeover. 
8.2.2.4.  TV and radio programmes 
comprised: 
•  a number ofTV and radio discus-
sions in which members of the gov-
ernment gave information and 
advice on the various aspects of the 
changeover; 
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duced by RTE and broadcast on the 
radio in January 1971; 
•  a series of three short educational 
programmes produced by RTE and 
broadcast on TV These TV pro-
grammes were repeated several times 
during the three weeks before the 
changeover to decimal currency. 
8.2.2.5.  Special measures were taken to 
help the elderly and the disabled. Vari-
ous members of  women's associations, 
local thinktanks, etc. were provided 
with information by government offi-
cials. This meant that they in turn 
could provide basic information on the 
coming changeover to the various 
branches of their associations through-
out the country. 
8.2.3. Bearing in mind the above expe-
riences and accompanying analysis, a 
large-scale information campaign 
should be organized, specially adapted 
to the specific needs of the euro, in 
order to prepare for the changeover. 
The campaign will also have to be 
accompanied by back-up measures for a 
limited time. 
8.3.  In order to ensure a successful 
changeover the information campaign 
should centre on the European citizen 
(bank staff, administration, employers 
and employees, consumers, teachers, 
family unit, etc.), gathering momentum 
and harnessing the cctrickle-down" effects 
of the relationships between the differ-
ent users of the currency. 
8.3.1. An overview of the impact of the 
introduction of the euro must be pro-
vided from the outset. We must first 
allay all the fears people have concern-
ing any loss of nationality, abandon-
ment of  sovereignty, rise in unemploy-
ment, price increases, etc. Simple, prac-
tical information must therefore be dis-
seminated, unlike the information 
made available for the referendum on 
the Maastricht Treaty. 
8.3.2. Surveys have generally shown 
that people have a positive attitude 
towards the introduction of the single 
currency, but wish more general infor-
mation were available. The round table 
discussions organized by the European 
Commission on 22-24 January 1996 
revealed that old people, housewives and 
people who have a sedentary lifestyle 
will be the most difficult sections to 
convince that the changeover to the 
euro is both important and necessary. 
The fact is  that these people use curren-
cy as  a means of payment, but only 
rarely carry out transactions involving 
currency exchange, unlike some profes-
sional people, for example. Everything 
thus depends on how far people are 
involved in financial dealings. 
8.3.3. The speed with which people 
adapt to the new system will depend on 
the difficulty of  the arithmetic in trans-
lating national currency into euros. For 
example, in order to change French 
francs into euros, the calculation should 
involve dividing by 7 (approx.). This is somewhat similar to the calculation 
involved in converting Belgian francs 
into French francs.  Experience has 
shown that French people who have 
lived in Belgium for many years contin-
ue to think in the currency they used 
when they were growing up. The 
upshot of this is  that whilst the conver-
sion from French francs into euros will 
probably be a simple operation, it 
might run up against the problem of 
mental complacency which arose previ-
ously.  But for each country, conversion 
will be a specific operation, involving 
varying degrees of complexity. 
8.4.  The approach involved will differ 
according to the degree of frequency of 
the various purchases. A distinction 
should be drawn between three types of 
purchase: frequent, everyday purchases 
(foodstuffs, newspapers, petrol, etc.); 
"one-off" purchases (car, house, etc.); 
and "intermediate" purchases (clothes, 
furniture, electrical goods, etc.). 
8.4.1. For everyday and "one-off" pur-
chases, the changeover to the euro 
should not pose any major problem. As 
far as everyday purchases are concerned, 
the fact that the housewife often buys 
the same products will make it easier 
for her to adjust to the new value scale, 
since she will not have to modifY her 
consumer patterns. 
8.4.2. "One-off" purchases occur so 
infrequently that the consumer does 
not rely on habit or any reference scale 
when shopping around. In this respect, 
the changeover to the single currency 
will not be dramatic. The consumer 
will only choose the product on the 
basis of research carried out at the time, 
and therefore in the currency which is 
legal tender at the time of the purchase. 
8.4.3. On the other hand, in the case of 
"intermediate" purchases, the consumer 
will have a greater tendency to convert, 
so as  to establish a value scale and in 
order to enable him to call upon con-
sumer experience with a view to facili-
tating price comparisons and taking 
advantage of competition. 
8.4.4. When the switch to the euro 
takes place, information campaigns will 
have to pay special attention to this 
aspect, and compensate for the infre-
quency of "intermediate" purchases by 
providing clear price displays for the 
products. Thus, the consumer will get 
used to the new currency thanks to an 
awareness of the price ranges of the 
products rather than through direct 
experience of buying. In all the above 
cases, checks will have to be carried out 
to avoid hidden price rises, since the 
force of competition may not be suffi-
cient to prevent them. 
8.5.  If long-term preparation is  to be 
effective, it should start now or, at the 
latest by the year 2000. The date is 
important psychologically - a new cur-
rency for the new millennium. In order 
to fit in with the schedule set out in the 
1.1. 2000  1.1. 2002  1.7. 2002 
< - preparatory measures - >  < - back-up measures - > 
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Treaty, the communication measures 
should begin on a large scale one year 
after the actual launch of  Monetary 
Union (introduction of the euro, fixing 
of conversion rates) on 1 January 1999. 
8.5.1. This would give banks and 
administrations time to adjust to the 
new currency. The extra costs ensuing 
from the obligation to inform should 
thus be financially acceptable. 
8.5.2. The preparatory measures will 
have to end on 31 December 200 1 - on 
the eve of the introduction of the euro-
and be replaced by back-up measures. 
8.5.3. This advance information con-
cerns the intermediaries and certain sce-
narios which should be envisaged. 
8.6.  Preparation through intermedi-
anes 
8.6.1. The information campaign  . 
should be carried out by local operators, 
which are in the best position to deal 
with business circles and individual citi-
zens, and should be geared to the spe-
cific needs of the user (consumer, tax-
payer, employee, job-seeker, social secu-
rity contributor, elector, small business, 
shopkeeper, etc.). Intermediaries should 
not be contacted individually; rather, 
existing inter-relationships should be 
exploited to the full in order to enhance 
the effect of the information campaign, 
by harnessing what could be called the 
''trickle-down effect". 
8.6.2. Thus, the authorities would 
inform the banks, who would inform 
the customer, who would inform 
friends and relatives, and so on. 
a.  Authorities 
Any information or papers from 
national authorities containing sums 
expressed in figures must advise the 
reader of the change. The term 
"authorities" must include social 
security departments (with which 
the user has frequent dealings), the 
Post Office, tax authorities, the 
police, the law courts, chambers of 
commerce and local authorities. 
b.  Employers and employees 
Every firm will have to organize its 
own staff training programme, paid 
for partly from its own resources and 
partly from external funding from 
the state or the EU. Trade unions 
can carry out excellent work in the 
field of communication by means of 
their training programmes. 
c.  Distributive trade staff 
Special attention should be devoted 
to this sector. Customers will often 
ask check-out assistants for help 
with prices. Consequently, intensive 
training courses must be provided 
for them in advance. 
d.  Bank staff 
Bank staff will have to have more 
intensive training, since they will have 
to understand the changes in order to 
be able to carry out their work, and 
also, more importantly, to explain the 
process to their customers. 
e.  Teachers 
A special effort must be made in 
schools, particularly with the 
youngest pupils who are not yet 
used to handling money, and for 
whom the euro will be their first 
and only national currency. For 
older pupils, the teacher will have to 
adapt and step up the examples. 
When calculating the cost of the 
"shopping basket", the arithmetic 
should be expressed in euros. Generally speaking, an information 
campaign for schools- from primary 
school to the sixth-form college -
will have to be set up with Commu-
nity support (along the lines of the 
LEONARDO programme). Com-
munity support could also extend to 
encouraging schools to make sure 
that internal financial transactions, 
such as those involving photocopies, 
school equipment, snacks, fund rais-
ing events for school trips, etc., can 
only be carried out in euros. The 
same kind of Community support 
could also be used to establish a 
European prize for the best idea for 
information on the introduction of 
the euro. Only schools would be 
allowed to compete and a prize 
would go  to the winning school. 
f  Consumer associations 
These could act as excellent go-
betweens for the public authorities 
and consumers, providing simple, 
easy-to-understand information. 
The more the information reflects 
daily life, the more the consumer 
will feel  involved. All consumer 
publications and TV programmes 
should focus regularly on the switch 
to the single currency. 
g.  Travel agencies 
Since the introduction of the euro 
will do away with currency exchange 
between countries which adopt the 
single currency, travel agents should 
be encouraged to help tourists 
understand the benefits that the 
introduction of the euro brings to 
their everyday life. 
h.  The media 
When France held a referendum on 
the Treaty on European Union, the 
former European Commission Presi-
dent, Mr Jacques DELORS, felt that 
it was not the Community's job to 
provide information and advertising 
for the new Treaty.  Consequently, 
Maastricht's detractors had no prob-
lem in putting forward often false 
arguments to discredit the Commis-
sion's efforts in this area. 
Here again, we must learn from the 
past. The Commission must get 
involved and provide funding for 
information on the transition to the 
euro, even though the ideal commu-
nication level must most definitely 
be as close as possible to the citizen. 
This Commission action could take 
different forms, e.g.  adopting com-
munications designed to provide 
encouragement, binding provisions, 
programmes with targeted funding, 
etc. Commission intervention is 
needed not because the Member 
States shirk their responsibilities, but 
because only the Commission can 
provide the necessary coordination. 
The success of the switch to the 
euro depends on coordinated com-
munication between the different 
Member States. This coordination 
requires identical communication 
measures to be introduced simulta-
neously in the Member States join-
ing the single currency, and also in 
those with a derogation. 
The Commission should enlist the 
support of the media. It might sug-
gest a national measure to encourage 
the press to print a countdown to 
the switch. In the same way, TV 
game show producers could be 
~ncouraged to express prize money 
m euros. 
Still in the field of television, arm-
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give prices in both currencies, and 
make arrangements for rapidly phas-
ing out the national currency, leav-
ing the price in euros only. 
Finally, advertisers (TV, hoardings, 
radio, newspapers) should be 
encouraged to display prices in 
euros. 
8.6.3. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee could constitute a very effective 
instrument for publicizing a pro-
gramme for promoting the introduc-
tion of the euro, such as  that launched 
by the Commission. 
8. 7.  Preparation through dual price 
display 
8.7.1. Dual price display is considered 
as one of the possible ways to familiar-
ize consumers with the new currency; it 
could serve to educate the public.  In 
order to take account of the specific 
characteristics of national markets, 
arrangments in respect of dual display 
should be determined at national level, 
in accordance with the principle of  sub-
sidiarity.  Prices should be displayed in 
both currencies for all everyday transac-
tions. 
8.7.2. Dual display of retail prices is 
designed to ensure that whenever a 
price is  given in national currency, its 
equivalent in euros should appear 
beside it. This measure means that for 
each product, four different values 
would be displayed on the same label. 
This is  because 1997 will see the entry 
into force of the Directive on price dis-
play by unit sold and by unit of volume 
or weight. Legibility and feasibility 
problems may arise here. 
8.7.2.1.  Since 1 September 1985, the 
French experience of  displaying prices 
by unit and volume for pre-packed 
products sold in stores larger than 
120m
2 has shown that French con-
sumers became used to reading two 
prices without any difficulty. Having 
several prices on the same label should 
not worry consumers too much, espe-
cially since the obligation will be limit-
ed to two and a half years. 
8.7.2.2.  Training will have to be pro-
vided for sales staff dealing with the 
sums involved and cash-handling 
machines will have to be adapted. As 
mentioned above, check-out assistants 
will need prior training in order to be 
able to answer the various questions 
customers will most certainly ask them. 
Cash registers will have to be adapted 
to provide a receipt in both currencies, 
at least for the total figure. When 
adapting them for the dual display 
requirement, they could be pro-
grammed from the outset to issue a 
receipt giving the price of each article 
in euros, but the total in both curren-
cies. This would avoid the need to 
adapt the cash registers several times. 
Thus, in practice, until 1 January 2002 
when the euro comes into circulation, 
consumers will use national currency to 
pay prices displayed in national curren-
cy and in euros. The advantage of this 
is  that at the end of the dual price dis-
play stage on 30 June 2002, cash regis-
ters will not have to be radically adjust-
ed once again. It will be sufficient to 
erase the facility allowing conversion 
and printing of the total in national 
currency, and leave the operation in 
euros only. 
8. 7.3. It is vital for the consumer to 
establish a link between income and 
outgoings if he is to get used to retail 
prices expressed in euros. Spending 
power will not be affected by the intra-duction of the euro, but reassurance 
must be provided in this respect. 
Accordingly, binding provisions should 
be introduced at Community level to 
ensure that payslips mention wages in 
national currency and euros. This 
should accompany the introduction of 
the dual display of retail prices. 
8.7.4. Special attention should be paid 
to the dual display of banking services: 
account statements should give the 
figures  ~or debit and credit in both 
currencies; 
cheque books: although cheques 
would still be made out in national 
currency, they could carry a conver-
sion table on the reverse side; 
documentation in respect of  loans 
should ~ive the amounts in both 
currencies; 
documentation in respect of securi-
ties  sho~ld give the amounts in both 
currencies; 
- automatic cash dispensers will have 
to be adjusted to give a receipt 
showing the amount withdrawn and 
the equivalent in euros. 
8.7.5. From 1 January 2002, cash dis-
pensers will have to be adjusted to dis-
pense euros only, and the receipt should 
show the equivalent in national curren-
cy until 30 June 2002. Persons wishing 
to withdraw cash in national currency 
will have to go directly to the bank 
counter. With effect from  1 September 
2002, cash dispensers will only be able 
to issue receipts showing withdrawals in 
euros. 
8.7.6. As  regards the dual display of all 
documents from the authorities, the 
term "authorities" should be understood 
in a broad sense, as was the case in ear-
lier sections of this Opinion. All tax 
documents (declarations, stamps, fines, 
etc.) and social security documents 
should give equivalents in euros. 
8.7.7. There are two types of repercus-
sions in connection with the introduc-
tion of the dual display: technical and 
financial. 
8.7.7.1.  First of all, the dual display 
requirement means that a very large 
number of machines will have to be 
adjusted: cash registers, cash dispensers, 
etc. Special new software will have to be 
developed for this. However, given the 
limited "shelf-life" of  software, those 
developed in 1996 will be almost obso-
lete by 2002. Thus, it is important to 
gauge the right moment for bringing in 
the new software to deal with the new 
data and requirements resulting from 
the introduction of the euro. 
8.7.7.2.  The costs involved in imple-
menting the dual display requirement 
should not be overlooked. These will be 
connected with the purchase and tai-
lored installation of the software, staff 
training, and losses due to conversion 
error (the decimal problem). In order to 
encourage economic operators to make 
the necessary preparations for dual dis-
play,  the public authorities could allow 
tax relief and tax deductions on the 
technical investments needed for the 
switch to the euro. The consumer's 
share of the changeover costs should be 
kept to the bare minimum. 
8.8.  Mter the switch on 1 January 
2002, the preparatory measures out-
lined above will be replaced by short-
term back-up measures for a maximum 
period of six months. 
8.8.1. This period will coincide with 
the date set for circulation of the euro 
(I January 2002) and withdrawal of 
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national currencies (1  July 2002 at the 
latest). The main change during the 
back-up period will be reversal of dual 
price display. During the preparatory 
period, the price in national currency 
will be followed by the euro-price, 
whereas during the back-up period, 
prices will be displayed in euros first, 
and then in the national currency for 
information only. The back-up mea-
sures will take over from the preparato-
ry measures and cover the same aspects. 
8.8.2. As of 1 January 2002, wages 
must be paid in euros, but payslips will 
also show the amount in national cur-
rency,  for information only. Prize 
money from betting, lotteries, etc. will 
have to be paid out in euros. 
8.8.3. As  regards banking services, cash 
dispensers will only alow withdrawals in 
euros. Cheques will have to be made 
out in euros, but a "round figure" con-
version table could be kept on the back 
of the cheque. 
9.  Summary 
9 .1.  The ESC welcomes the planned 
monetary union in Europe which will 
make a fundamental contribution to 
bringing about a Europe which is closer 
to the citizen, more highly respected at 
international level and in a better posi-
tion to create jobs and wealth within its 
boundaries. 
9 .2.  In order to make the convergence 
monitoring process transparent, the 
convergence criteria must be applied 
clearly (see Points 2.4. and 2.7.). 
9.3.  It is  the Council which will final-
ly make a political assessment of the 
achievements of the Member States 
with a view to deciding whether they 
are to be admitted to the third stage of 
EMU. Too small a group of Member 
States would not justify the high costs 
associated with introduction of the new 
currency. 
9 .4.  The ESC recommends that 
countries which fail  to meet only one of 
the five convergence criteria be exam-
ined again on the basis of real conver-
gence criteria. 
9. 5.  Exchange rates should be set at a 
level which ensures that speculative dis-
tortions have no lasting impact during 
the transition to monetary union. 
9.6.  The ESC considers it essentially 
counter-productive to assume that 
departure from the convergence princi-
ples as  a result of circumstances beyond 
government control can be penalized by 
financial sanctions. 
9. 7.  As  regards the derogation coun-
tries, the ESC would draw particular 
attention to the adverse consequences of 
their long-term exclusion from EMU, 
especially against the background of EU 
enlargement. 
9.8.  The ESC would like to see an 
inflation target published in the future 
single currency area. An intermediate 
monetary target should be a main plank 
of the ECB's monetary policy. In order 
to make money-market control more 
effective the ESC would like to see a 
minimum reserve requirement applied 
to deposits with commercial banks, 
attracting a rate of interest close to the 
market rate. 
9.9.  The ESC urges that monetary 
relations between the core group of 
Member States participating in the 
third stage of monetary union and the 
other Member States be regulated in 
order to (a)  guarantee the continued 
smooth operation of the internal mar-ket, (b)  ensure a high degree of 
exchange-rate stability between the sin-
gle currency and the national currencies 
and (c)  facilitate the non-participating 
countries' subsequent transition to the 
single currency. 
9.1 0.  With these aims in view,  the 
ESC supports the establishment of an 
exchange-rate mechanism on the lines 
of the EMS in which the single curren-
cy would act as an anchor. 
9 .11.  In view of the high level of  struc-
tural unemployment in the EU, the 
ESC calls for the objective of full 
employment to be accorded greater pri-
ority in European economic policy. 
9.12.  The ESC would remind the gov-
ernments of the Member States of the 
guidelines for structural reform of the 
labour markets adopted by the Essen 
European summit. The ESC regrets 
that so far few Member States have sub-
mitted programmes for the implemen-
tation of these measures. 
9.13.  The ESC points out that the free 
collective bargaining between employers 
and workers successfully practised in 
many EU Member States must retain 
its place in European economic life. 
9.14.  The introduction of the euro will 
require a number of back-up measures 
to prepare those working in the various 
Brussels, 26 September 1996. 
The President 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Carlos Ferrer 
sectors involved and the public at large. 
Both the preparatory measures and the 
back-up measures taken after the intro-
duction of the euro will have to be 
geared to the target groups. In the 
ESC's view, we should draw on the 
French experience (with the introduc-
tion of the new franc)  and the UK and 
Irish experience (with the introduction 
of decimal currency) in order to ensure 
that citizens are prepared for the 
changeover in good time. 
9.15.  If the changeover is  to take place 
under optimal conditions, the first step 
which needs to be taken is  to launch 
information campaigns. Special roles 
could be played here by administra-
tions, employers and employees, staff in 
the distributive trades, bank staff, con-
sumer associations and, indeed, by the 
ESC. The media have a vital role to 
play; they should be encouraged to 
issue a countdown to the changeover, in 
the interests of the general public. 
9 .16.  Dual display (national currency 
followed by the euro in the run-up to 1 
January 2002 and the euro followed by 
national currency post 1 January 2002) 
in respect of prices, wages and contri-
bution slips - which should also take 
account of the specific characteristics of 
national markets - could help con-
sumers to avoid confusion. 
The Acting Secretary-General 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Adriano Graziosi 
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Rapporteur: Robert Pelletier (France- Employeurs) 
Opinion adopted on 1  0 December 1997 
The communication submitted for the 
Committee opinion is the result of the 
work of a group of experts chaired by 
Mr A. Giovannini. It sets out technical 
recommendations on the redenomina-
tion of the bond, equity and derivative 
markets and on the market conventions 
which should be applied to the new 
euro capital market. 
1.  General comments 
1.1.  The importance of market con-
ventions, i.e. self-regulation by profes-
sionals, should be stressed. This is why 
the Commission has wisely decided to 
rely to a great extent on expert opinion. 
1.1.1. The approach adopted by the 
Commission is in response to the mar-
kets' expressed preference for  recommen-
dations rather than a regulation. The 
experts from the various Member States 
have drawn up a series of  technical rec-
ommendations summarizing the views 
of operators on the degree of harmoniza-
tion needed for the establishment of  a 
euro capital market which will be as liq-
uid and as  transparent as possible. 
1.2.  The approach is pragmatic and 
progressive and takes account of the 
different practices, conventions and 
national standards which still apply in 
the domestic markets and some of 
which will necessarily continue after 4 
January 1999. 
1.2.1. In this respect the Commission 
is  to be congratulated for having con-
ducted numerous consultations with 
professional organizations representing 
market operators. 
1.3.  The consultations carried out by 
the Economic and Social Committee 
have in most cases confirmed the line 
taken by the Commission. This con-
firms that market operators have an 
international and common view of the 
operation of the markets for bonds, 
fixed-interest, equities, derivatives etc. 
1.4.  In view of the many technical 
questions tackled by the Commission's 
communication and in order to avoid 
making the opinion too long, the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee has 
decided to address only questions to 
which it can bring "added value". If a 
problem has not been mentioned, this 
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implies that the Committee endorses 
t?e solution adopted by the Commis-
siOn. 
1.5.  The Commission communica-
tion clearly explains the very complex 
processes involved in introducing the 
euro on capital markets. The Economic 
and Social Committee congratulates the 
Commission on having placed this 
aspect of monetary union in a more 
general perspective in its recent com-
munication1 on the practical aspects of 
introduction of the euro. 
1.6.  The latter document is a fitting 
complement to the communication cur-
rently under discussion, in that it 
addresses various legal problems connect-
ed with the euro, tax, accounting etc. 
2.  Specific comments 
2 .1.  The bond market 
2.1.1. In December 1995 the Madrid 
European Council decided that from 
the start of stage three of EMU all new 
tradable public debt would be issued in 
euros. This was a precondition for the 
adoption of the euro by the financial 
markets on 4 January 1999. This deci-
sion was not in itself sufficient however. 
The main countries have since 
announced that they would also convert 
a significant part of their outstanding 
debt into euros after this date, thus cre-
ating a critical mass likely to guarantee 
the liquidity of the markets and a 
benchmark yield curve for euro interest 
rates. To date France and Belgium have 
confirmed that they will convert their 
public debt into euros. Germany adopt-
ed a draft law in the Council of Minis-
ters on 24 September 1997 enabling 
OM 730 bn. to be denominated in 
euros. This would provide optimum 
conditions for the operation of the repo 
and derivative markets, with a solid 
foundation of euro-denominated securi-
ties. 
2.1.2. In some Member States however 
certain issues of government debt made 
available to the general public will con-
tinue to be denominated in the national 
currency. 
2.1.3. In most Member States therefore 
the liquidity, transparency and efficien-
cy of the government bond market will 
be enhanced by the quotation and set-
tlement of negotiable debt instruments 
and bonds in euros. The conversion of 
negotiable public debt is certain to be 
followed by that of major corporate 
bonds. Less liquid and smaller issues 
will however remain denominated in 
the national currency until their matu-
rity. 
The main conversion methods 
2.1.4. The fact that conversion to the 
euro will not yield a round number will 
pose considerable problems of adapta-
tion for firms, individuals and markets. 
It is for example difficult to envisage 
securities with a nominal value contain-
ing two figures after the decimal point. 
This kind of amount will not make it 
easier for physical persons to conduct 
market transactions. Many countries 
will therefore, after conversion to the 
nearest cent, have to round up to units 
of 1 euro, 10 euros or 1  00 euros. 
COM(97) 491,  I October 1997. See also  ESC 
opinion on rhis communication (CES  1406/97, 
II  December 1997). 2.1.5. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee therefore considers that the 
method of rounding to the nearest cent 
could be used for the redenomination 
of negotiable debt; another possibility 
would be renominalization with the 
payment of compensation. Both meth-
ods have their advantages. 
2.1.5.1.  National measures should 
however be taken to prevent bond-
holders from being penalized in the 
area of taxation. 
2.1.6. Redenomination on the basis of 
individual bonds 
A bond with a national currency 
unit value of 2000 could be rede-
nominated, in the case of France 
for example, as  a bond with a value 
of euro 312.60, i.e. 2000/6.39795 
(conversion factor to five decimal 
places) rounded to the nearest 
cent. 
One consequence of this operation 
is  that the amount of outstanding 
debt in euros would not be a whole 
number. 
2.1.  7.  Redenomination on the basis of 
a ftxed minimum denomination with 
cash compensatory payments 
To take a French example again, a 
bond with a national currency unit 
value of 2000 is converted into 312 
bonds with a nominal value of euro 
1,  i.e.  2000/6.39795 (conversion 
factor to five decimal places) with 
the payment of cash compensation 
of 60 cents. The result of this oper-
ation is  that the amount of out-
standing debt in euros would be a 
whole number, which would 
enhance liquidity and make it easier 
for the public to understand the 
conversiOn. 
The securities would then be quoted 
in multiples of euro 1 (1 00, 1,000 
etc.) and negotiated on the basis of 
a capital amount in multiples of 
euro 1. 
2.1.8. Whatever method is chosen, it 
will entail rounding. There are four lev-
els at which the impact of rounding 
will have to be taken into account: 
•  individual portfolios 
•  portfolios at financial institution 
level 
•  depositories 
•  global volume of  securities issued. 
2.1.9. The preferred method of the 
group is  the bottom-up method. One 
of the advantages of this method is  that 
there is  no change in the value of an 
issue and that the risk of rounding 
errors is  reduced as  each individual 
holding is  converted. Contrary to what 
the communication suggests, redenomi-
nation on the basis of a fixed minimum 
denomination with cash compensatory 
payments is a bottom-up method. This 
analysis should be corrected in the 
communication. 
2.1.1 0.  The three other methods 
described in the report are as far  as we 
know the least used. 
2.1.11.  The survey carried out by the 
European Banking Federation confirpis 
that the Member States are in the 
process of adopting the detailed meth-
ods for the conversion of government 
debt. It is  essential that the Commis-
sion collect technical information, the 
accuracy of  which has been confirmed 
by each of the Member States, and dis-
seminate this widely. 
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2.2.1. Market conventions need to be 
harmonized in order to increase effi-
ciency and transparency. 
2.2.2. The main conventions concern: 
•  day counts 
•  coupon frequency 
•  business days 
•  euro settlement basis. 
The professional associations represent-
ing these markets have defined market 
conventions which command a broad 
consensus and which will rapidly 
become points of reference for the sin-
gle market. 
2.2.3. The recommendations put for-
ward by the communication on these 
various points are welcome but will, for 
example in the case of business days, 
require national legislation. Moreover, 
the communication rightly points out 
that harmonization will generate costs 
and cause delays. 
2.3.  The equity markets 
2.3.1. These markets are more sensitive 
in that they display greater diversity 
from one Member State to another 
than the fixed-interest markets. They 
concern a large number of small savers 
who have invested in securities either 
directly or via collective investment 
vehicles. 
2.3.2. However, the basic assumption is 
that a single currency will be used for 
quotations, for legal reasons, but also in 
the interests of simplicity and public 
comprehension. 
2.3.3. It should be made easier for 
companies to redenominate their shares 
in euros. This will no doubt depend 
more on the development of  euro 
accounting than on quotation in euros. 
It would however be desirable for the 
conversion of share capital into euros to 
be done in as  flexible a way as possible. 
National legislation could be enacted to 
enable boards of directors to decide, if 
they so wish, to convert their company's 
share capital into euros, without the 
need to convene a general meeting of 
shareholders. 
2.3.4. A company wishing to redenom-
inate its shares in euros has four 
options: 
•  to leave shares indefinitely with a 
par value of unrounded euros; 
•  to convert the share par value 
rounding to the nearest cent; 
•  to change the par value to a round 
number of euros and have a com-
mon nominal value; 
•  to move to non par value shares. 
2.3.4.1.  In view of the diversity of the 
laws governing changes in share capital, 
a recommendation conferring powers 
on general meetings of shareholders or 
boards of  directors in this regard would 
be welcome. 
2.3.5. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee would like to see the introduc-tion of non par value shares encour-
aged. Legislation in this field is in 
progress in each of the Member States 
and this should be encouraged. 
2.3.6. In its general considerations on 
the equity markets the Commission 
rightly notes that "issuers tend to focus 
mainly on their national share market". 
2.3.7. On the other hand, the assertion 
that "the introduction of the single cur-
rency and the disappearance of 
exchange rate risk in the euro area will 
not, at least in the short term, modify 
the existing relation between issuers 
and their domestic markets" should be 
qualified. 
2.3.8. Independently of the effort to 
increase competition made via the 
investment services directive, the conse-
quences should not be underestimated 
of opening up a large euro market with 
international issuance standards and 
tougher requirements on issuers with 
regard to quotation, lodging of 
accounts, profitability ratios, advertising 
of issues; these will have the effect of 
driving from the market medium-sized 
companies unable to withstand the 
competition from large companies in 
the euro market, thus losing their tradi-
tional access to the national market. 
2.3.9. The impact of the international-
ization of the euro market on condi-
tions for the financing of small and 
medium-sized European enterprises 
merits more detailed study by the com-
petent authorities. 
2.4.  The derivative markets 
2.4.1. The main problem here is conti-
nuity of contract. The adoption of two 
Council regulations on the introduc-
tion of the euro
2 will help establish a 
solid legal basis for the start of the third 
stage. Some countries, e.g.  the USA, 
have legislated in this area. 
2.4.2. The Committee welcomes the 
legal analyses undertaken by the Com-
mission which confirm that by virtue of 
the "lex monetae" a legal principle rec-
ognized on all major financial markets, 
the continuity of contracts expressed in 
currencies replaced by the euro should 
also be guaranteed in non-member 
countries.  This analysis remains how-
ever to be confirmed in some smaller 
countries. 
2.4.3. It would be a good idea for the 
Commission to undertake a large-scale 
communication campaign to inform 
non-EU countries as to the real nature 
of these problems so as to prevent com-
mercial misunderstandings. 
2.5.  Price sources 
2.5.1. Several national panels are in the 
process of constructing market price 
indicators. Eventually, with the intro-
duction of the euro, price sources in 
national currencies will disappear. 
2.5.2. The associations representing 
credit institutions and market operators 
have created a EURIBOR. Similarly, 
2  Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 
1997 on certain provisions relating to the intro-
duction of the euro (adopted on the basis of  Arti-
cle 235 of the Treaty), OJ No L 162 of 19 June 
1997. 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the introduc-
tion of the euro (approved by the Council on 7 
July 1997; the regulation will be adopted on the 
basis of Article 1091(4) of the Treaty as  soon as  the 
decision as  to the Member States adopting the 
euro has  been taken) OJ No C 236 of 2 August 
1997. 
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the European Monetary Institute has 
agreed to calculate a EURIMEAN 
which would be disseminated via the 
European Banking Federation. All the 
professional organizations representing 
credit institutions are involved in the 
se~ting up of panels representative of 
pnce sources. 
2.5.3. The principle of creating new 
price sources for the euro zone based on 
a sample of banks representative of the 
zone will provide a European bench-
mark for new contracts from 1999 
onwards. It would be a good thing for 
domestic price sources to disappear in 
Member States where national law 
allows this or, if they continue, for 
them not to be widely publicized. This 
is a precondition for the creation of a 
single financial market. 
2.5.4.The principle of continuity of 
contract does not mean that existing 
price sources should continue to apply 
after 4 January 1999 providing that 
there is a new price source close to the 
old one which can be substituted. 
2.6.  Reserve requirements
3 
2.6.1. Considerable efforts are being 
made to ensure that the capital markets 
are efficient. The imposition of reserve 
requirements would totally compromise 
the establishment of a unified euro cap-
ital market. 
2.6.2. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee must point out the risk, if this 
were done, of business moving to euro 
markets not subject to reserve require-
ments. It is particularly worrying that 
the establishment of a single financial 
market in euros should be penalized 
and that for regulatory reasons the euro 
market should have to develop outside 
the countries participating in economic 
and monetary union. 
2.7.  Tax 
2.7.1. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee shares the Commission's view 
that "regardless of the level of harmo-
nization achieved in terms of market 
conventions and practices there will still 
be distortions resulting from differences 
in national tax regimes". 
2.7.2. However, the Economic and 
Social Committee does not consider it 
possible to wait until the introduction 
of the euro has created a general aware-
ness of the distortions to seek a solution 
to a situation which has become unac-
ceptable in terms of competition. 
2. 7 .2.1.  Accordingly, the Economic 
and Social Committee stresses the sig-
nificance of the measures recently pro-
posed by the Commission which will 
inter alia produce a code of conduct 
designed to prevent harmful competi-
tion in the area of taxation. 
3.  Conclusion 
3.1.  The Economic and Social Com-
mittee would like to highlight the qual-
ity of the communication referred for 
its opinion. It hopes that the Commis-
sion will in future continue to be guid-
ed by the desire to keep abreast of the 
concerns of market operators, rather 
than imposing rules which in all likeli-
hood would lag behind the practices of 
the professionals. 
3  See also opinion of the Economic and Social Com-
mittee of 24 March  1993 on minimum reserves in 
the context of the internal market (rapporteur: Mr 
Meyer-Horn), OJ No. C  129 (p.  10) of 10 May 
1993. 3.1.1. The initiatives taken by the rep-
resentative professional associations 
demonstrate their ability to carry out 
the harmonization of  professional rules 
necessary for the development of a 
transparent and liquid financial market 
for the euro. 
3.2.  The Economic and Social Com-
mittee stresses the need to monitor, 
almost on a day-to-day basis, the devel-
opment of market practices, which are 
Brussels,  1  0 December 1997. 
The President 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Tom Jenkins 
constantly changing. 
3.3.  Drawing on its members' know-
how,  the Economic and Social Com-
mittee could provide the Commission 
with detailed technical assistance on 
problems related to the introduction of 
the euro on the markets which remain 
to be resolved. The Committee would 
like to be involved throughout the 
process of introducing the euro. 
The Secretary-General 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Adriano Graziosi 
59 on the 
Communication fram  the,Commi$sion 
''Practical aspects of  the introduction of  the euro" 
Rapporteur: Umberto BURANI {Italie - Employeurs) 
Opinion adopted 11  December 1997 
1.  Introduction 
1.1.  The communication in question 
was presented by the Commission to 
the Ecofin Council meeting in Luxem-
bourg on 13 October 1997; an updated 
version will be presented at the Luxem-
bourg Summit on 12-13 December 
1997. This document contains infor-
mation on the practical preparations 
implemented, in the Member States 
and at EU level, in the run-up to adop-
tion of the euro. It also indicates the 
decisions that still have to be taken 
within a very tight timespan: basically, 
by the end of 1997. 
1.2.  This "progress report" on work 
in preparation for the introduction of 
the euro establishes a link with the 
1995 Green Paper
1 and the decisions 
taken at the Madrid European Council 
on 15-16 December 1995. The Eco-
nomic and Social Committee has issued 
several opinions
2
,  both on this subject 
and a number of specific issues. 
1.3.  In view of the urgency of draw-
ing up with all speed the opinion 
COM(95) 333 final 
2  Opinion of 26 October 1995  on the " Green 
Paper on the practical arrangements for the 
introduction of  the single currency" (OJ No. C 18 
of 22 January 1996) 
Opinion of 28 September 1996 on ''The impact 
of Economic and Monetary Union: Economic 
and social aspects of  convergence and measures to 
increase awareness of  the single currency" (  0 J 
No. C 30 of 30 January 1997) 
Opinion of  31  October 1996 on the "Market 
implications of  the legislation and reguultions 
required  for the transition to the single currency" 
(OJ No. C  56 of 24 February 1997) 
Opinion of 29 May 1997 on "Arrangements for 
stage three of  economic and monetary union: sta-
bility and  growth pact  for ensuring budgetary 
discipline,  reinforced convergence procedures, and 
a new exchange rate mechanism" (OJ No. C 287 
of 22 September 1997) 
Opinion of 10 December 1997 on the Commis-
sion Communication "The impact of  the intro-
duction of  the euro on capital markets" (CES 
1408/97) 
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requested by the Commission, the 
Committee is confining its comments 
to aspects which call for future deci-
sions or initiatives and will leave an 
appraisal of past or ongoing work until 
a more suitable juncture. 
2.  Work programme
3 
2.1.  The Commission regards it as 
"essential'' that Member States, before 
the end of 1997, present their own 
action plans in connection with: 
•  the transition programme, including 
statements on accounting, reporting 
and tax declarations in euro; 
•  public issuers' intentions on rede-
nomination of existing debt
4
; 
•  the final design of the national faces 
of euro coins; 
•  the launch of national communica-
tion campaigns; 
•  national positions on the tax conse-
quences of transition. 
2.2.  Lastly,  the Commission wonders, 
whether national or Community mea-
sures would be preferable on a number 
of practical points; in the latter case,  the 
question is whether to adopt legislation 
or to allow market self-regulation, pos-
sibly with the adoption of codes of 
practice. Here again, the study should 
be completed by the end of 1997. 
3.  Preparations in progress
5 
3.1.  (On the preparations being made 
by the national public administration 
(point 1.2 of the communication)). The 
Committee observes that tangible 
progress has been made on ... commu-
nication in almost all countries. The 
communication mentions that, in line 
with the "free option" principle, com-
panies must be able to choose whether 
their transactions are to be in euro or in 
the national currency, at any stage dur-
ing the transition phase. 
3.2.  In addition, the Committee 
would draw the attention of  the Com-
mission and the Member States to a 
measure of  inflexibility in this rule: once 
the transition has taken place, it becomes 
irreversible. In other words, after opting 
for the euro, the company will no longer 
be able to revert to national currency. 
The new adoption programmes involved 
could prove to have certain shortcomings 
which will necessitate complex, lengthy 
rectification procedures, and possibly a 
temporary return to the old programmes. 
The Committee is therefore opposed to 
irreversible options, which can impede 
the process. 
3.3.  The Communication confirms 
that all national administrations will 
retain national currency for their inter-
nal accounting throughout the transi-
tion period. The Committee is pleased 
to see that the recommendation it 
made in 1995
6  has been acted upon. 
The potential cost implications for 
administrations of  having to accept 
euro payments from the general public 
(and presumably having to make euro 
payments where requested) still have to 
be assessed. 
3  See rhe communication's "executive summary" 
4  See the Commission Communication "The 
impact of the introduction of the euro on capital 
markers"  (COM(97) 337 final of2July 1997) 
Chapter I of the communication 
6  Opinion of 26 October 1995, points 5.3.11. and 
6.4.3 4.  Accounting and fiscal aspects7 
4.1.  Views differ on the investments 
and expenditure that will have to be 
shouldered by companies for the transi-
tion to the euro. The Committee has 
already stated its opinion on this point
8
, 
to the effect that market rules should 
facilitate fair apportionment of such 
costs. In various Member States the 
trend would seem to be towards a mea-
sure of fiscal flexibility taking account 
of transition costs. This approach is  cer-
tainly feasible but the Committee 
would warn against discrepancies in 
treatment between the Member States 
and, at national level, between the vari-
ous economic categories. The move to a 
single currency must not aggravate the 
taxation differences that already exist in 
Europe. 
5.  Practical aspects of  concern 
to currency users
9 
5.1.  The Committee considers that 
users should not have to bear any 
charges for scriptural conversions aris-
ing from the mandatory conversion of 
accounts by banks at the end of the 
transitional period and from the con-
version of a credit transaction into the 
currency of the beneficiary account. 
Banks should also convert national cur-
rency in amounts usual for private 
transactions into euros at no charge. All 
other scriptural and conversion transac-
tions, and the transparent identification 
of potential charges arising, should be 
regulated by voluntary codes of conduct 
within the sectors concerned. It is  rec-
ommended that consumers be provided 
with additional information in the form 
of national euro-labels to identifY 
charges properly levied. 
5.1.1. On conversion charges (point 
4.3 of the communication) voluntary 
agreements or codes of practice should 
be given preference over regulation, but 
transparency should be the rule in all 
cases of conversion, stating either that 
the transaction is  free of charge or indi-
cating the rates charged. 
5.2.  In the Committee's view,  1 Janu-
ary 2002 should be retained as  date for 
the first issue of euro notes and coins. 
5.3.  Dual display (point 4.2. of the 
communication). In line with the sub-
sidiarity principle, the Member States 
should decide for themselves, via legis-
lation, whether the dual display of 
prices should be mandatory during the 
co-existence period, or whether the 
business circles concerning (particularly 
the retail trade) should, through their 
organization, make a voluntary com-
mitment to calculate and display the 
new price correctly at the set conversion 
rate from the cut-off date. In addition, 
retailers could be called upon to give 
their customers every possible assistance 
in adjusting to the new euro currency 
and its value, for example, by providing 
small pocket calculators on shopping 
trolleys, conversion tables of key prices, 
etc. During the preceding period, the 
Committee is  opposed to Community 
legislation, which could well prove ill-
adapted to the differing national situa-
tions. Market forces would seem a more 
appropriate means of bringing about 
the adoption of dual display, where this 
proves necessary or useful. 
7  Point 3.2 of the communication 
8  Opinion of 26 October 1995, points 6.2.4. to 
6.2.7. 
9  Chapter 4 of the communication 
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5.3.1. Legislation or regulations should 
focus primarily on preventing abuse of 
consumer interests possibly in the 
shape of inaccurate conversion or 
deliberate misuse of the "rounding-
off" rules. The Committee wonders 
whether this aspect is  to be studied in 
greater depth by the Commission and 
Member States. It is  important that the 
consumer should be able to check that 
prices tally,  but even more important to 
ensure that an exact equation is 
required of  sellers of goods and ser-
vices.  Offenders acting in bad faith, for 
instance in cases of deliberate and sys-
tematic breaches of the rules, would be 
guilty of the crime of fraud. 
5.4.  One aspect which the Commu-
nication has not broached is  the role of 
payment or prepaid cards during the 
transition period. In its Opinion on 
the Green Paper, the Committee point-
ed out that such means of payment 
incorporate - or will shortly do so - ele-
ments and/or details in microprocessor 
cards so as  to allow payment in one 
currency or another and/  or to convert 
between currencies. In the latter case, 
there would be the additional advan-
tage of an automatic conversion check 
on the prices indicated by sellers. 
5.4.1. The Committee suggests that the 
Commission study in greater depth the 
various aspects involved in the use of 
cards so as  to improve understanding 
and use with the means at its disposal. 
Here the market (and especially con-
sumers) needs to be given guarantees, 
through the rapid solution of matters 
which have been pending for some 
time, (e.g. the recovery of costs borne 
by card carriers). 
5.5.  Length of the co-existence peri-
od (Phase C). To avoid unnecessary 
queues at bank counters on the first 
days after introduction of euro notes 
and coins and to facilitate a calm, 
orderly and cost-effective conversion of 
national currency into euro notes and 
coins, Phase C must run for a certain 
minimum period. If Member States 
allow only a few days for conversion 
from national currencies to the euro, 
such undesirable consequences will be 
unavoidable. Member States should still 
be empowered to set the length of 
Phase C under Article 15 of the Coun-
cil Resolution of 7 July 1997 on the 
legal framework for introduction of the 
euro, but the Commission is  neverthe-
less  urged to provide assistance to the 
Member States in keeping each other 
informed and in discussing the length 
of Phase C. 
6.  Communication activities
10 
6.1.  The Committee takes note of 
the action taken in this field by the 
Commission and the Member States -
as well as  by organizations of economic 
players and consumers - both with and 
without Commission funding. Howev-
er,  from an initial cursory appraisal of 
the programmes, two aspects would 
seem to have been overlooked, or to 
have received little attention: 
•  the fact that the euro will be legal 
tender alongside national currencies 
for a certain period:  hence the call to 
avoid needless queues at bank 
counters during the initial days of 
conversion. A smooth changeover -
as  has always been the case when 
new notes are substituted for notes 
to be withdrawn from circulation-
10  Chapter 5 of the communication is  not just an organizational matter; 
there are also spin-off effects for 
conversion costs, as  referred to in 
point 5.1.  above; 
•  the practical aspects of use of  pay-
ment or prepaid cards (see point 
5.5.  above). Issuers of payment 
cards, prepaid cards and electronic 
purses are required to provide objec-
tive information on the practical 
aspects of using their card systems. 
The Commission should provide 
additional, neutral information 
which does not gloss over possible 
disad  van rages. 
Brussels,  11  December 1997. 
The President 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Tom Jenkins 
7.  Financial markets
11 
7.1.  The Committee has stated its 
position on this point in its Opinion on 
the Commission Communication "The 
impact of  the introduction of  the euro 
on capital markets"
12
• 
11  Chapter 7 of the communication 
12  (Currently in preparation) 
The Secretary-General 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Adriano Graziosi 
65 .  · .  Gist:~af:the  ·8pinibn 
of  the Economic and Socicil Committee 
Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements for 
the Introduction of  the Single Currency 
In 1995, the Committee issued an 
Opinion on the Green Paper on the 
practical arrangements for the introduc-
tion of  the single currency (OJ C 39 of 
12.02.96) - rapporteurs: Mr Umberto 
Burani (Italy- Employers), 
Mr Bernard de Bigault du Granrut 
(France - Various Interests) and 
Mr Michael Geuenich (Germany-
Workers). As  this is  not a recent opin-
ion it is  not reprinted in full in this 
booklet. The opinion is,  however, 
summarized below. 
Commission proposal 
The Green Paper of 31  May does not 
put forward a definitive scenario for 
the introduction of the single curren-
cy. It simply looks at the technical 
and legal aspects in the light of a 
three-stage sequence. 
1.  Phase A: The European Council 
decides to launch the single cur-
rency. 
2.  Phase B:  Launch of  Economic and 
Monetary Union, with the 
exchange rates fixed  irrevocably. 
An increasing number of transac-
tions should be carried out in the 
new currency (creation of a critical 
mass, leading to a point of no 
return). 
3.  Phase C: Final transition to the 
single currency, which becomes 
the sole means of payment. 
Committee Opinion 
Support for the Commission move to 
implement and facilitate transition to 
a single currency. Transition should be 
as  speedy as  possible, taking account 
of the market's capacity to adjust 
smoothly to change, the need to min-
imize costs, and the extent to which 
EMU is  used to boost job-creating 
growth. 
Pragmatic approach to practical prob-
lems: directives and regulations only 
when strictly necessary. 
Need for outline scenario so as  to pre-
dict the situation of countries granted 
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exemption, indicating what measures 
will have to be taken to avoid mone-
tary disruption and particularly the 
emergence of an unbridgeable gulf 
between these countries and those 
that have joined the single currency 
system. 
Need for stringent application, with 
a political vision, of admissibility cri-
teria; political derogations only possi-
ble if they do not endanger the 
future stability of the single currency. 
Enhancement of the role of the 
European Central Bank. 
Support for the "critical mass" solu-
tion. The components must be clear-
ly indicated and defined, without 
repercussion on the markets: the 
banking sector should operate as  an 
interface between the national cur-
rency and single currency as soon as 
it is  in a position to do so and pay-
ment systems have been adapted for 
that purpose. 
Adoption of the single currency may 
disturb the financial, monetary and 
securities markets. Regardless of 
assurances to the contrary- hopefully 
warranted - the authorities are 
responsible for anticipating possible 
destabilizing speculation and deter-
mining the necessary counter-mea-
sures. 
Acceptance of the possibility of a 
gradual market transition to the sin-
gle currency during phase B, on con-
dition that this is entirely voluntary, 
that decisions are taken in full 
knowledge of the costs and benefits, 
and that competition is  not unduly 
distorted. 
The costs of transition to the single 
currency should be borne and appor-
tioned according to the rules of the 
market, with intervention only when 
really necessary. 
Need to set up, as  soon as  possible, a 
sound legal framework to underpin 
the single currency. In particular, the 
non-renegotiability of  contracts and 
the validity of conversion rates on 
the securities and exchange markets 
(both European and non-European) 
must be guaranteed. 
Framing of effective legislation 
against forging and using single cur-
rency banknotes in the fight against 
organized crime, including alterna-
tives or substitutes for money. 
Recognition of the role of the public 
authorities in transition to the single 
currency, especially with the issue of 
government bonds immediately after 
the start of phase B.  However, care 
should be taken during this phase, in 
relations with the market, to avoid 
partial or full  change-over to the sin-
gle currency which can cause disrup-
tion. This applies particularly to the 
tax authorities and social security. 
Consumer interests must be heeded 
and protected as  part of the overall 
policy of transition to the single cur-
rency.  In particular: 
The consumer must be made aware 
of Europe's aim in adopting a single 
currency, the advantages he stands to 
gain and the way the transition to 
the new currency will be organized. 
Here a joint, coordinated drive, 
involving the Commission, the 
Member States and companies, in 
particular banks, will be necessary. The consumer must be able to reap 
the benefits of the single currency at 
minimum cost. The Commission 
and the Member States, though 
refraining as far as possible from 
imposing regulations, will have to 
show great vigilance in ensuring that 
this condition is  respected. 
The consumer should be able to 
familiarize himself with use of the 
single currency even before it comes 
into force and check that the conver-
sion rates are strictly applied. The 
Commission and the consumer asso-
ciations have pinpointed one single 
way of achieving this result: dual 
indication of prices and charges on 
bills, banking documents and 
payslips. Businesses object that the 
mandatory dual pricing requirement 
can generate additional costs, extra 
paperwork and organizational com-
plications. While reserving the right 
to return to this matter, the Commit-
tee cannot ignore the justification, in 
principle, of  such arguments. The 
consumer rights referred to above 
must be protected but a balance has 
to be found with the rest of the mar-
ket, including alternatives which 
achieve the same results. 
Effective training, education and 
communication strategies are needed. 
In the case of training, responsibility 
will devolve to the Commission, 
Member States, sectoral organizations 
and individual companies, in turn. 
By ensuring coordination, duplica-
tion of tasks will be avoided. 
Education must be provided in 
schools of all levels and types, with 
the single currency taught as a specif-
ic subject. 
Communication strategy calls for a 
separate, specialist study, enlisting all 
available aids. However, as it is likely 
to be extremely expensive, a careful 
assessment will be needed of the 
potential impact in relation to the 
aids available. The business sector -
especially banks - will play a key role 
in getting the message across to con-
sumers. 
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U .  h"  "  stng t  e  euro  -
no more difficult than child's play! 
A film made by children with the support of 
the Economic and Social Committee 
The Econon1ic and Social Cornmittee (ESC), Mrs Bonino, Member 
of the EC Con1n1ission and Mrs Guigou, MEP and President of 
Europartenaires, lent their support to the n1aking of a film (in  French) 
on the use of the euro. The film, entitled ":L euro, c' est comn1e un jeu 
d'  enfants" ("using the 'euro' - no more difficult than child's play") is  a 
digital anitnation of the drawings of children aged between 5 and 10, 
with a comtnentary by the children themselves. The filn1 was officially 
launched at the European Parliament· in Brussels on Monday,  17 
March. 
The film was made by the non-profit-making association IEED and is 
the fruit of an unprecedented teaching experiment.  During the school 
year 1995-1996 a total of 208 children and their 10 teachers from the 
primary school ''Nos Enfants" in Brussels worked on the project of 
understanding- and being able to explain to adults - the switchover to 
the ecu, prices in ecu and the value and exchange rate of the ecu. 
Amidst a general fear of the introduction of the euro, the children -
even the smallest children - manage to explain, using their own words, 
fresh approach and imagination, this historical event which is  consid-
ered to be so complex. 
The ESC is  pleased to have lent its support to this initiative which 
backs up its own recommendations with regard to the information 
campaign which should be launched to promote the euro. Sous le patronage 
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